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ABSTRACT 
 American society conventionally expects immigrants to assimilate, yet 
contemporary views question whether Latin American immigrants are choosing to 
conform to this standard. However, this perspective does not account for the structural 
constraints placed upon immigrants through the influence of U.S. foreign and 
immigration policy. During the Cold War, two cases—Cuba in the 1960s and El Salvador 
in the 1980s—demonstrated differential U.S. policy responses to sustained, large-scale 
exile migrations to the United States, particularly to Miami and Los Angeles. In these 
cases, the U.S. response was to welcome and provide a positive reception to Cubans in 
Miami, while Salvadorans were excluded and constrained by the negative reception 
afforded to them as illegal migrants in Los Angeles, with both responses stemming from 
U.S. foreign policy interests in Latin America. Twenty-five years after the first wave of 
exiles from each of these countries, both second generations appear to be assimilating in 
terms of educational attainment, but Salvadoran-Americans lag behind Cuban-Americans 
in occupational attainment and income levels. These differential outcomes indicate that 
reception contexts—government responses, economic opportunity, societal attitudes, and 
presence of ethnic communities—may accelerate or delay exile groups’ rates of structural 
assimilation, with legal status playing a major role in determining whether groups 
assimilate upward or downward. 
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The United States has a history of enacting immigration policies as a part of its 
broader foreign policy efforts.1 This was evident in the early 1960s when, at the height of 
the Cold War, foreign policy concerns exerted a major influence over U.S. immigration 
policy decisions toward Central America and the Caribbean.2 President John F. Kennedy’s 
1961 Cuban Refugee Program invited Cubans to flee communism and emigrate to the U.S., 
which, until 2017, granted most Cubans asylum.3 The converse was true for Salvadorans: 
during its civil war from 1980–1992, the Reagan administration supported the anti-
communist junta as a Cold War ally4 and, as a result, refused asylum to migrants fleeing 
widespread state-sponsored violence.5 Nonetheless, many fled from El Salvador to the 
U.S. illegally and lived under a precarious and uncertain legal status6 Today, the Cuban 
and Salvadoran immigrant populations in the U.S. are comparable in size—1.9 million as 
of 2013—but as a whole, appear to have divergent assimilation patterns in terms of 
criminality, education rates, occupational attainment, and income.7 These two cases point 
to a link between U.S. policy and immigrant assimilation patterns in the U.S., prompting 
                                                 
1 Christopher Mitchell, “Preface,” in Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign 
Policy, ed. Christopher Mitchell (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), x. 
2 Christopher Mitchell, “Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, 
Central America, and Mexico,” in Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy, ed. 
Christopher Mitchell (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 6.  
3 Ibid., 25, 39; Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Frances Robles, “Obama Ends Exemption for Cubans Who 
Arrive Without Visas,” New York Times, January 12, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/world/
americas/cuba-obama-wet-foot-dry-foot-policy.html?_r=0. 
4 William Stanley, “El Salvador: State-Building before and after Democratisation, 1980–95,” Third 
World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 101–102, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/4017662.  
5 Susan Bibler Coutin, “Introduction,” Nations of Emigrants: Shifting Boundaries of Citizenship in El 
Salvador and the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2007), 6.  
6 Bibler, “Introduction,” 8–9.  
7 Gustavo Lopez and Eileen Patten, The Impact of Slowing Immigration: Foreign-Born Share Falls 




the following question: how has U.S. Cold War–era foreign and immigration policy 
affected the assimilation of Cuban and Salvadoran populations in the U.S.?  
Ultimately, this thesis finds that in the context of the Cold War between 1959 and 
1980, U.S. foreign policy determined U.S. immigration policy towards Cuba and El 
Salvador. In turn, the emerging national position vis-à-vis each country shaped the national 
and enclave cities’—Miami and Los Angeles—context of reception to each immigrant 
group: the positive context of reception for Cubans led to successful upward structural 
assimilation in the second-generation adult children of the initial diaspora, and the 
negative, later passively accepting, context of reception led to partial upward structural 
assimilation for the Salvadoran population. Within the reception context, both cases 
demonstrated that the legal status accorded to them were instrumental to their upward 
structural assimilation: Cubans were given access to permanent residency and citizenship 
from their arrivals, but Salvadorans were accorded this privilege a few years after their 
arrival. This difference in legal status affected the rate of structural assimilation for each 
case and indicates that according legal status to immigrants—whether refugees, exiles, or 
illegals—may facilitate structural assimilation in the long-term. 
Particularly in today’s political and social landscape, this question warrants 
investigation because immigration policy and assimilation shape American identity. 
Whether the United States is a “nation of immigrants,” as declared by President John F. 
Kennedy—echoing President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s sentiments—or a nation at risk of 
immigrants, as feared by Samuel Huntington—echoing modern-day nativists across the 
country—the process of immigration is undoubtedly essential to the future of American 
identity.8 Throughout America’s immigration history, dating back to the Founding Fathers, 
society has promoted and expected the assimilation of immigrants into Anglo-American 
culture.9 Without arguing the merits or drawbacks of such an expectation, this thesis begins 
with an understanding that assimilation is a major concern for the emergent nationalist 
political movement in American society; thus, it merits analysis as to how best achieve it 
                                                 
8 Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2004), 38–39. 
9 Ibid., 131–132. 
 3 
without jeopardizing American values.10 Contrary to Huntington’s polemic assertions 
about the Hispanic immigrant population, intra-Hispanic variation exists and may be best 
explained by the influence of structural factors as opposed to cultural ones. 
Considering the multitude of factors that affect immigrant assimilation and the 
emergence of a Hispanic subculture that academics like Huntington contend do not 
conform to American mainstream culture, two areas emerge for exploration. First, how do 
the assimilation patterns of intra-Hispanic immigrant groups in the U.S. compare? Second 
to what extent does U.S. foreign policy in concert with American immigration policy 
influence assimilation patterns?  
With regard to the first question, on Hispanic immigration to the U.S., extensive 
studies have been conducted on Mexican migration; however, significant and growing 
immigrant populations from Central America and the Caribbean have also made their way 
to the U.S. and, by comparison, are less studied.11  Moreover, Mexican migration to the 
U.S. has slowed continuously since 2007; by 2015, the net migration flow was actually 
negative.12 In contrast, immigration from Cuba has increased since the 2014 normalization 
of relations with the island,13 and the immigrant population from Central America has 
increased consistently for the past few decades, without signs of abatement.14 The vast 
differences between the countries and their émigrés demonstrate Hispanic immigration is 
                                                 
10 Carlos Lozada, “Samuel Huntington, a prophet for the Trump era,” Washington Post, July 18, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/book-party/wp/2017/07/18/samuel-huntington-a-prophet-for-the-
trump-era/?utm_term=.e516e67b1578. 
11 Michael J. White and Colin Johnson, “Perspectives on Migration Theory – Sociology and Political 
Science,” in International Handbook of Migration and Population Distribution, ed. Michael J. White (New 
York: Springer, 2016), 71; Donato, et al. “Introduction: Migration in the Americas: Mexico and Latin 
America in Comparative Context,” 6. 
12 Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, More Mexicans Leaving Than Coming to the US, Washington, DC: Pew 
Research Center, 2015, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/11/19/chapter-1-migration-flows-between-the-u-
s-and-mexico-have-slowed-and-turned-toward-mexico/. 
13 Jens Manuel Krogstad, “Surge in Cuban immigration to U.S. continued through 2016,” Pew 
Research Center, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/13/cuban-immigration-to-u-s-
surges-as-relations-warm/. 
14 Gabriel Lesser and Jeanne Batalova, “Central American Immigrants in the United States,” 
Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2015, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-
american-immigrants-united-states. 
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far from a monolithic movement15—neither the political context of Mexican immigration 
nor its assimilation patterns is representative of all Hispanic populations, particularly when 
migrations are due to political shocks and violence.16 Insofar as the quantity of immigrants 
from a particular country affects their assimilation, these diverging immigration rates point 
to a potential spectrum of assimilation patterns. 
As to the second question, scholars like Jorge Dominguez and Christopher Mitchell 
pioneered the study of U.S. foreign policy’s intersection with immigration policy in the 
Western Hemisphere, but their focus has been on the interaction of the two for policy 
formulation.17 The larger body of immigration policy studies focuses on the flow of 
migration both from the sending states and to the receiving states, with an emphasis on 
political economy.18 This thesis builds upon Dominguez and Mitchell’s explanation of 
immigration and foreign policy-making and applies this nexus to the incorporation of 
Hispanic immigrants into receiving societies, specifically the United States. 
Additionally, because the U.S. government applies various immigration policies to 
intra-Hispanic immigrant groups, understanding policy’s effect on U.S. reception to 
immigrants from particular countries of origin provides nuance to assimilation patterns.19 
To contribute to the body of knowledge on the variety of intra-Hispanic, non-Mexican 
migration, this research focuses on two Cold War migrations that were prompted by and 
met with diverging U.S. policy responses: the 1960s Cuban and 1980s Salvadoran 
diasporas. For Cuban immigrants, U.S. policy granted them virtually automatic legal status 
and assistance, generating a divergent experience from Salvadorans, who for decades 
                                                 
15 Katharine M. Donato, et al. “Introduction: Migration in the Americas: Mexico and Latin America in 
Comparative Context,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 630 (2010): 
13–14, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/20743985. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Christopher Mitchell, “Introduction: Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Caribbean, 
Central America, and Mexico,” in Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy, ed. 
Christopher Mitchell (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 6–10. 
18 Donato, et al. “Introduction: Migration in the Americas: Mexico and Latin America in Comparative 
Context,” 12. 
19 Seth J. Schwartz, et al., “Perceived Context of Reception among Recent Hispanic Immigrants: 
Conceptualization, Instrument Development, and Preliminary Validation,” Cultural Diversity & Ethnic 
Minority Psychology 20, no. 1 (January 2014): 2, doi:10.1037/a0033391. 
 5 
experienced “permanent temporariness” in their legal status.20 Because both of these 
experiences were a consequence of U.S. foreign policy goals affecting immigration policy, 
the effects of this interaction on assimilation outcomes begs further exploration. Moreover, 
given the length of time since their arrival, these cases can be assessed in view of their 
long-term structural assimilation through their second generation. 
B. HYPOTHESIS 
Given the complexity of migration, it is unlikely that only one aspect of it is 
responsible for structural assimilation patterns. However, a review of the literature 
indicates that U.S. policy might play a role in shaping those outcomes with welcoming 
policies producing positive contexts of reception and unwelcoming policies producing 
negative contexts of reception. The context of reception is a multi-faceted term for the 
experience of arriving immigrants, which the literature indicates is a major factor in the 
assimilation paths of immigrants; I limit the effects of extraneous factors by focusing on 
the initial exile waves with comparable human capital endowments in two large enclave 
cities—Miami and Los Angeles. To the extent that U.S. immigration policy affects the 
context of reception, it may be a principal factor in determining structural assimilation 
outcomes. Thus, this thesis explores the federal government’s role in the context of 
reception within: economic conditions, government response, societal attitudes, and the 
presence of ethnic communities for both case studies.21 Accordingly, my hypotheses focus 
on the role of federal government policy in shaping the context of reception for the initial 
immigrant arrivals from Cuba and El Salvador and the structural assimilation of their adult 
second-generation children, about twenty to thirty years after arrival: 
Hypothesis: U.S. foreign and immigration policies shape the constraints within the 
context of reception of the first generation and have corresponding directional implications 
                                                 
20 Cecilia Menjívar, “Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives in the United 
States,” The American Journal of Sociology 111, no. 4 (January 2006): 1030, http://search.proquest.com/
docview/195953015/. 
21 Nora Hamilton and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, Seeking Community in a Global City: Guatemalans 
and Salvadorans in Los Angeles (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001): 12–13. 
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for the structural assimilation patterns of second-generation adult immigrants—Cubans 
demonstrating upward and Salvadorans demonstrating downward structural assimilation. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Migration theories explain the dynamics of population movements and contribute 
to the formulation of immigration policy. The effects of U.S. immigration policy on 
immigrant groups’ adaptation requires understanding the broader phenomenon of 
international migration—specifically, why people choose to emigrate to their given 
destinations and how they fare when they choose to stay. Within the broad, 
interdisciplinary field of international migration, there are two main branches: the study of 
the determinants that stimulate and inhibit migrations and the study of migrant adaptation 
in their destinations, usually in the form of assimilation.22 Within both of these branches, 
the field of international relations explores the role of the state in these phenomena.23 On 
a micro level, it seeks to understand how migration affects individual political behavior; 
on a macro level, how it affects state behavior.24 This literature review provides a survey 
of the migration theories scholars have proposed to explain the emergence of migration 
systems from developing states to developed liberal democratic states and the myriad of 
possible outcomes for immigrants at their destinations.  
No single theory provides a comprehensive explanation for the emergence of a 
migration system, but, taken together, they provide insights into various aspects of its inner 
workings. The nexus between these varied disciplines is complex but necessary to 
understanding international migration (see Figure 1).25 Individually, each theory seeks to 
explain one of the following: the structural forces that promote emigration from a country; 
the structural forces that stimulate immigration to a country; the individual motivations of 
                                                 
22 White and Johnson, “Perspectives on Migration Theory – Sociology and Political Science,” 69. 
23 Ibid., 78. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Sara E. Kimberlin, “Synthesizing Social Science Theories of Immigration,” Journal Of Human 





international migrants; and the social and economic structures that create a migration 
system.26 Thus, this literature review is divided into two sections, one on the determinants 
of migration, the other on migrant adaptation. The first section examines determinant 
theories—why people choose or are forced to migrate—including neoclassical economics, 
the new economics of labor migration, segmented labor market theory, world systems 
theory, the theory of cumulative causation, and forced migration. The second section 
appraises social science theories of migrant adaptation—how migrants adjust to their new 
countries—to include acculturation theory, focused on the linear and segmented 
assimilation models, and the emergent theory of transnationalism. 
 
Figure 1.  Conceptualizing Immigration as an Intersection between Human 
Behavior and the Social Environment.27 
                                                 
26 Douglas S. Massey, Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the 
Millennium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 281. 
27 Source: Kimberlin, “Synthesizing Social Science Theories of Immigration,” 766. 
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1. Theories on Determinants of Migration 
Determinant theories seek to explain why migration systems emerge, both on the 
macro and micro levels of analysis. The macro-level structural forces that attract migrants 
to developed countries are central to world systems theory, neoclassical macroeconomics 
theory, and segmented labor market theory.28 Micro-level theories focus more on 
individual motivations for immigration, as captured in neoclassical microeconomics 
theory, new economics of labor migration, and cumulative causation theory.29 Moreover, 
forced migration theories explore the determinants of migration but within a context of 
conflict and crisis in origin countries. 
Arguably the most expansive of the macro-level determinant theories, Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s world systems theory is a neo-Marxist view of immigration that explains 
immigration from less developed countries to richer, more industrialized countries as a 
form of capitalist exploitation by corporations.30 Accordingly, this theory expects 
migration to be sustained through increasingly global sources of migrants as capitalism 
penetrates non-capitalist states and creates a “disrupting, dislocating, and disintegrating 
dynamic” that inspires emigration.31 This encourages or forces migration by reducing local 
job markets and creating labor demands in manufacturing industries in new locations.32 
Over time, this theory has come to view migration as a byproduct of globalization, whereby 
global economic interdependence facilitates the phenomenon of migration.33 
Critics of this theory contend it cannot be tested empirically and relies upon 
forecasts instead of data and thus is not as useful or valid as economic theories. However, 
                                                 
28 Kimberlin, “Synthesizing Social Science Theories of Immigration,” 763. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.; Douglas S. Massey, “Why Does Immigration Occur?” in The Handbook of International 
Migration: The American Experience, ed. C. H. Hirschman, P. Kasinitz, and J. DeWind (New York: 
Russell Sage, 1999): 41. 
31 Ibid.; Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, “From Immigrant to 
Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration,” Anthropological Quarterly 68, no. 1 (1995): 48, 
doi:10.2307/3317464. 
32 Massey, “Why Does Immigration Occur?,” 41. 
33 Douglas S. Massey et al., “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal,” 
Population and Development Review 19, no. 3 (1993): 432, doi:10.2307/2938462. 
 9 
prolific migration scholar and economic sociologist Douglas Massey contends that the 
social, economic, political, and cultural changes that world systems theory attributes to the 
expansion of capitalism are indeed supported by empirical evidence as the origins of 
migrations.34 He argues that this expansion disrupts local economies in the sending 
countries, overtakes the existing employment structures, and thus generates a pool of 
workers in search of new opportunities. In Massey’s words, “international migration does 
not stem from a lack of economic development, but from development itself.”35 From this 
perspective, international migration can be understood as not only inevitable, but as an 
expected consequence of economic growth for developed states, and its worldview on 
migration is built upon by economic theories of migration. 
Another macro-level determinant theory is the neoclassical economics theory of 
migration, which contends that observable differences in labor demand between states 
trigger permanent migrations from less developed to more developed economies. 
Emerging from world systems theory, neoclassical economics theory expects that people 
displaced by capitalist expansion seek to maximize their odds of employment and increased 
remuneration in emerging markets, usually by moving from rural to urban areas.36 On an 
international scale, this usually translates into the movement of people from developing to 
developed countries; Massey claims that when “researchers have examined the empirical 
connection between wages in receiving countries and emigration from sending countries, 
they have found a significant positive correlation.”37 This supply-and-demand view of 
immigration essentially views labor demand in wealthy nations as the drivers of 
immigration from countries with less developed economies.38  
                                                 
34 Douglas S. Massey, “International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of 




37 Ibid., 304. 
38 Kimberlin, “Synthesizing Social Science Theories of Immigration,” 181–193. 
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Building upon the globalization dynamic captured in world systems theory and the 
labor demand from neoclassical macroeconomics, the segmented labor market theory 
specifically identifies the bifurcation of labor markets as a determinant of migration flows 
to developed countries. Michael Piore’s 1979 theory posits that in post-industrial, wealthy 
nations, native workers gravitate toward higher-skilled and-paid employment in the 
primary job sector, which generates a structural demand for people to fill low-pay, low-
skill jobs in the secondary job sector.39 As a result of the organic bifurcation of the labor 
market, employers rely upon immigrants to fill the low-wage jobs and even recruit 
immigrants for this purpose, generating a migration flow.40 Apart from explaining the 
origins of migration flows, segmented labor market theory posits that, once established, 
these flows become self-perpetuating systems and provide a continuous flow of immigrants 
to fill unwanted jobs.41 Support for Piore’s segmentation of the labor market has emerged 
clearly in multiple studies of developed countries for decades; however, its emphasis on 
recruiting to promote migrations has received limited empirical support, calling into 
question the explanatory power of this theory for migration flows.42 Additionally, the work 
of other scholars, such as Alejandro Portes and Robert Bach, identifies a third segment of 
the labor market, which they dub the “ethnic enclave.”43 In this enclave of people from the 
same origin country, immigrants find employment that yields similar benefits and 
improvements in capital and human capital as they would if employed in the primary 
sector, providing an alternative explanation for sustained migration flows to particular 
enclave cities.  
In addition to macro-level causes of migration, determinant theories also include 
micro-level explanations of migration. These theories for migration, neoclassical 
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microeconomics theory applies the notion of rational actors to individual decisions to 
migrate. This theory uses a market approach for the determinants of migration, whereby 
individuals migrate to maximize their utility.44 Similar to the other economics theories, 
this theory focuses on the movement of labor in pursuit of higher wages, but it incorporates 
individuals’ cost-benefit analysis into the decision rather than presupposing automatic 
migration in the face of opportunity in developed countries.  
Similarly, the new economics of labor migration theory applies the concept of 
utility maximization to migration, but at the group level. This theory posits that instead of 
individual decisions to migrate, households and even communities are the rational actors 
that decide to undertake migration based on promoting their economic interests and on risk 
management.45 This theory includes the calculations of families in pursuit of increases in 
income relative to others in the community of origin, not just absolute income. According 
to Massey, empirical evidence also suggests households struggling with the 
transformations of early economic development in their origin countries migrate as a way 
to manage risk and overcome market failures.46 Massey also notes migrants and migrant 
families may move abroad temporarily to earn income and send it back to their country of 
origin. Thus, this theory incorporates not only the pursuit of capital but also the 
minimization of risk to the migrant and their family.  
Additionally, cumulative causation theory attributes the self-perpetuating character 
of international migration to the phenomenon’s impact on individual motivations and the 
socioeconomic networks it creates. When migration initially occurs, it causes secondary 
effects to both the origin country and the destination country.47 As economically 
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successful immigrants earn income, they send remittances back to their original country, 
which promulgates a sense of relative deprivation in the origin community and inspires 
others to emigrate.48 Moreover, in the destination countries, immigrants create enclave 
markets tailored to the goods and services of their immigrant community, increasing the 
demand for low-wage immigrant labor.49 These effects are essentially feedback loops that 
are perpetuated by the networks migrants establish at both the origin and destination and 
facilitate migration and reduce the risks of others to undertake the same journey. 
Lastly, the interdisciplinary sub-field of refugee and forced migrations also 
provides determinant theories for migration, but within a context of conflict and crisis in 
origin countries. Originating in the 1980s, in response to global conflicts and increases in 
asylum-seekers, this approach aims to understand why people flee or stay in a country 
when faced with political violence.50 Under such circumstances, root causes—like 
oppression and inequality—set conditions for migration, but require the catalyzing effect 
of a proximate cause, like war, to stimulate a migratory stream.51 While this may be true, 
few types of political violence actually provoke large-scale refugee flows.52 
Accordingly, theories on forced migrations are complemented by conflict studies. 
In a review of conflict-driven migration theories, Sarah Lischer identifies political violence 
as “genocide, politicide [eliminating a group based on political ideology], and civil war,” 
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an approach supported by the analysis of Schmeidl, Fein, and Jonassohn.53 Relatedly, in 
his literature on civil war, Kalyvas separates political violence into conflict and violence 
to characterize the forced migrations and conditions in an origin country, endeavoring to 
facilitate tailored political solutions.54 Lischer further refines conflicts into civil conflict: 
persecution, failed state, civil war, and genocide; and international conflict: invasion, 
border wars, and third party intervention.55 Through this disaggregation of the concepts, 
Lischer seeks to explain how the nature of a conflict affects the forced migration and how 
they interact with one another.56 She notes that the forced movement of people in civil 
wars may be viewed as a political tool, not necessarily a tragic humanitarian by-product of 
it.57 Additionally, Lischer caveats her work with an important observation: individual 
decisions to migrate may be influence by more than just the conflict, since the resulting 
“economic devastation, epidemics, or environmental destruction” can also “endanger their 
livelihoods.”58 This approach to understanding forced migrations reflects the discipline’s 
emphasis not only on understanding the phenomena’s causes, but to find political solutions 
for the conflicts and their subsequent migrations.59 Moreover, the interdisciplinary 
approach necessarily links forced migration flows to the policy decisions of both the 
countries of origin and host countries. 
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2. Theories of Migrant Adaptation 
Migrant adaptation theories seek to explain the behavior of immigrants in their 
destination countries as they develop new identities in response to their new environments. 
While there are extensive hypotheses, both normative and empirical, as to how this process 
occurs, this section focuses on the empirical arguments because arguing the merits of 
assimilation is beyond the scope of this thesis. First, as part of acculturation theory, the 
models for linear and segmented assimilation are reviewed, followed by the emergent 
theory of transnationalism.  
Acculturation theory, developed by John Berry in 1974, explains changes in 
immigrants’ identity and behavior relative to their new countries on a continuum: 
assimilation—immigrants over time internalize the new culture; separation—immigrants 
retain their old culture without adopting a new culture; integration—immigrants retain 
parts of their old culture and adopt parts of their destination country’s culture; and 
marginalization—individuals discard both the old and new cultures.60 Because a large 
volume of literature concentrates on assimilation and previous studies have explored the 
assimilation patterns on Cuban and Salvadoran immigrant populations, this review focuses 
on its two main camps: straight-line assimilation and segmented assimilation. 
The most studied aspect of acculturation—assimilation—historically regards 
migrants who abandon their origin countries’ cultures and embrace the culture of their 
destination country as successful immigrants.61 In the early twentieth-century U.S., this 
equated to the linear adoption of Anglo-American culture over time—classical assimilation 
theory. However, contemporary research now measures assimilation in broader terms:62 
For example, in 2005, Waters and Jimenez evaluated assimilation across two generations 
and birth cohorts through immigrants’ socioeconomic status, geographic dispersion, 
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language acquisition, and intermarriage.63 They compared immigrants and their children 
to other Americans according to those categories and found support for the notion that 
immigrants generally do assimilate in the U.S. Other U.S.-based studies by Alba and Nee 
and White and Glick found similar support for immigrant assimilation.64 Moreover, Alba 
and Nee developed their new assimilation theory that expands the definition of assimilation 
beyond just immigrants’ actions to include their interaction with the societal structures that 
surround their daily lives.65 Most studies of migrant adaptation conclude that immigrants 
fare well economically (compared to their economic success in their origin country) and 
attain social integration in their destination countries over time.66 While the generality of 
assimilation theory is certainly a factor in its durability, it is also its main shortcoming: any 
evidence showing immigrant adoption of new norms supports it, and evidence showing 
continued differences counter the theory.67 
Adding nuance to the existing assimilation theories, Portes and Rumbaut developed 
the segmented assimilation theory, in which the interaction between immigrant group 
characteristics and their treatment in the new society generate differences in assimilation 
across immigrant groups.68 This theory, combined with Portes and Zhou’s take on the 
concept, holds that three distinct forms of adaptation manifest in second-generation 
immigrants as a result of their immigrant group’s characteristics: upward assimilation—
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growing acculturation and integration into the white middle class; downward 
assimilation—permanent poverty and assimilation into lower classes; upward assimilation 
and biculturalism—rapid economic advancement coupled with deliberate preservation of 
culture, values, and group solidarity.69 Ultimately, they determined that when immigrants 
engage in selective assimilation—not full assimilation—it facilitates their economic 
success.70 Critics of this theory note that it appears to apply exclusively to the U.S. 
immigrant experience and that segmented assimilation is more the exception than the 
rule.71 Nevertheless, some support for this theory emerged in Hirschman’s study of 
immigrant youth educational attainment and White and Glick’s survey of immigrant 
assimilation in the U.S., in which segmented assimilation emerged but was not the 
assimilation pattern of the majority of immigrants.72 Nonetheless, segmentation therefore 
provides viable explanations for assimilation patterns that do not fit the expected linear 
progression. 
While neither segmented nor linear assimilation theory predicts the same outcomes 
for all immigrant groups, they both recognize the importance of the “context of reception” 
in those outcomes. In sociology, the context of reception is the term given to “the 
opportunity structure, degree of openness versus hostility, and acceptance” in the host 
society.73 It can be positive or negative and can set the trajectory and even admittance of 
immigrant groups.74 For instance, as presented in studies by Portes and Rumbaut and 
Menjivar, racial and ethnic discrimination, lack of political status, and ill will in the general 
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public can contribute to a negative context of reception.75 The inverse is also possible 
where immigrants are welcomed and provided with opportunities for employment and legal 
status, providing a positive context of reception.76 Within the context of reception, Kao 
and Rutherford refine the concept of social capital in immigrant families as related to 
educational and social involvement in their children’s lives, finding differential levels and 
impacts of social capital between immigrants and native-born Americans.77 These studies 
indicate that institutional factors in the immigrant- receiving societies and the preexisting 
immigrant communities themselves all contribute to the acculturation models of 
immigrants and their subsequent generations. Moreover, in understanding the context of 
reception, different assimilation patterns may become more predictable as continued 
studies explore specific immigrant groups rather than pan-ethnic groups such as Hispanic 
or Latino. 
The last of the migrant adaptation theories we will discuss is the theory of 
transnationalism, which explores immigrants’ relationship to their old country on a 
spectrum between disconnection and transnationalism. This emerging approach to 
immigrant adaptation has developed as a result of globalization facilitating immigrants’ 
links to their homelands.78  Rather than viewing adaptation as a one-way phenomenon as 
acculturation does, transnationalism frames immigrant adaptation as a two-way exchange 
between the sending and receiving countries.79 On the one hand, immigrants may have 
extensive social, political, economic, cultural, and familial ties to their countries of origin, 
exhibiting transnationalism; on the other hand, immigrants may also sever all ties to the 
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old country, displaying disconnection.80 This theory also encompasses the multiple 
identities immigrants maintain via simultaneous ties to both their countries of origin and 
destination.81 Glick, Schiller, Basch, & Szanton-Blanc were the first to link the concept of 
transnationalism to migration and migrant identity.82 They propose that migrants to the 
U.S. are actually “transmigrants” because they are “immigrants whose daily lives depend 
on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public 
identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state.”83 While there is 
broad consensus in the field that this phenomenon is not new, it is recognized as a new 
perspective on immigration.84 Moreover, in his summation of empirical studies on 
transnationalism, Portes concludes that assimilation and transnationalism are not mutually 
exclusive—they actually occur simultaneously in established immigrants.85 
The focus of this literature review has been on two aspects of migration studies: the 
determinants of migration and the adaptation of migrants. Specifically, theories for 
determinants of migration include economics theories—neoclassical economics, the new 
economics of labor migration, segmented labor market, world systems, and cumulative 
causation—provide insights on the wage, labor demand, and inequality factors that 
promote and sustain migrations and inform the formulation of immigration policy. The 
reviewed migrant adaptation theories—acculturation and transnationalism—indicate that 
they are not mutually exclusive processes. However, immigrant adaptation in the U.S. is 
overwhelmingly studied in terms of assimilation, with robust studies on linear and 
segmented assimilation in particular. These studies consistently conclude that immigrants 
generally do assimilate, albeit in different ways across groups.  
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D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis examines the relationship between the divergent immigration policies 
applied to 1960s Cuban and 1980s Salvadoran immigrant arrivals to the U.S. and the 
resulting structural assimilation patterns in their second generations. For this comparative 
study, I first establish the historical contexts, both for the political shocks and violence that 
stimulated migration from the countries of origin and in the policy and overall reception in 
the United States, of first-wave immigrants from Cuba and El Salvador, via a methodical 
review of the relevant and abundant secondary and historical literature. These cases were 
selected precisely for their Cold-War context and its enduring legacy: Cubans fled 
communism and were welcomed in the United States as political refugees because of 
America’s anti-communist stance, whereas that same stance precluded Salvadorans from 
the designation because they fled a dictatorship that was fighting communist insurrection. 
In the Cuba case study, the independent variable is a welcoming U.S. policy, whereas in 
the Salvadoran case study, it is a dissuasive U.S. policy; the dependent variable for both is 
second-generation structural assimilation. 
Within these cases, I focus on the initial cohort of migrants from each country 
because of previous studies that find similarities between pioneer migrants across Latin 
America—they tend to be ambitious and risk-tolerant individuals.86 Moreover, I conduct 
a qualitative review of both diasporas’ characteristics to establish some parity between 
them in the pre-migration context. Given some predictable differences between the two 
countries and their populations’ attributes, this review explores intra-group variations to 
reduce the possibility of those variables (i.e., pre-migration socioeconomic status, 
educational attainment, pre-established enclaves in the U.S.) as the deciding factors in 
structural assimilation outcomes.  
Lastly, to determine each group’s structural assimilation outcomes, I compare data 
available on these cases from secondary sources that use the Children of Immigrants 
Longitudinal Study (CILS), which surveyed second-generation Americans on delinquency, 
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early child-bearing, education, employment, and income. Using this data, I qualitatively 
compare assimilation characteristics, in two cities with concentrated diasporas: Miami and 
Los Angeles and supplement it with prepared datasets on native-born Hispanic groups’ 
educational attainment, occupational attainment and income. To supplement missing data 
fields or data on particular cohorts both pre and post immigration, I make use of 
demographic information from the U.S. Census Bureau, think tanks like Migration Policy 
Institute and Pew Research Center – Hispanic Trends, and the data from the existing 
academic literature on Cuban and Salvadoran assimilation. 
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II. U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 
The immigration policy set forth by the United States is influenced by a multitude 
of factors, ranging from the international relations sphere to the bureaucratic processes that 
implement it. During much of the Cold War, when the international environment 
constrained foreign policy tools in Latin America, immigration policy became an 
alternative instrument of power, and, as such, the ideological orientation of a country 
determined its émigrés’ qualification for entry into the United States. Through a welcoming 
immigration policy toward Cubans, the United States sought to undermine the communist, 
Soviet-aligned regime in 1960s Cuba and overthrow Castro, granting Cubans asylum from 
political persecution as a way to demonstrate the superiority of American values to 
communism. Conversely, in the 1980s, when a communist insurgency threatened to take 
over El Salvador, the United States buttressed its support of the country’s right-wing 
military junta by promoting a restrictive immigration policy toward Salvadorans. Thus, 
Salvadorans were not granted asylum from their civil war’s widespread human rights 
abuses because it would have undermined the legitimacy of the Salvadoran junta. 
These decisions to grant or deny admission to these forced migrants were set by the 
Kennedy and Reagan administrations: John F. Kennedy used executive privilege to admit 
Cubans as refugees, as well as congressional liaison to expand his policy; Ronald Reagan, 
limited by the 1980 Refugee Act, asserted his power as the executive by abstaining from 
extending protections to Salvadorans until pressed by political forces. Moreover, as the 
evolution of immigration laws increasingly restricted executive agency in immigration and 
refugee admissions, foreign policy’s influence over immigration became less overt because 
it was internalized as standard policy in bureaucracy, as when as administration’s national 
refugee designations affect individual asylum cases en masse. Lastly, as the role of 
Congress became more prominent, the influence of the administration’s foreign policy 
influences on immigration became the subject of public debate over the contradiction 
between welcoming immigrants from communist regimes while denying those from 
embattled friendly countries. 
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The forthcoming discussion presents these themes first through an overview of U.S. 
immigration policy development through the 1980s, followed by the specific foreign policy 
and immigration policy contexts of the two cases, Cuba and El Salvador. The Cuban case 
shows that U.S. immigration policy was proactively used to support overarching foreign 
policy goals. In contrast, the Salvadoran case demonstrates how the implementation of U.S. 
immigration policy corresponded to the existing foreign policy goals. In both cases, U.S. 
foreign policy in Latin America stimulated large-scale migrations to the United States. 
A. U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY THROUGH THE 1980s 
Until the United States Congress passed the first exclusion law in 1875, the United 
States did not have and enforce immigration policies. Rather, America embraced almost 
limitless immigration, in the spirit of George Washington circa 1783: “the bosom of 
America is open to receive not only the opulent and respectable Stranger, but the oppressed 
and persecuted of all Nations and Religions; whom we shall welcome to a participation of 
all our rights and privileges if by decency and propriety of conduct they appear to merit the 
enjoyment.”87 Perhaps the one exception to this trend was the Alien and Sedition Acts of 
1798, which allowed the deportation of those deemed dangerous; but it was not enforced 
and was allowed to expire after two years.88 The major shift in American immigration 
policy occurred in successive waves of increasingly restrictive laws against criminals and 
prostitutes (1875); those with impaired mental capacity (1882); contract laborers (1885); 
“epilepsy, vagrancy, polygamy, and radical political beliefs” (1903); and some physical 
handicaps and unaccompanied minors (1907).89 In addition to these restrictions, Congress 
passed the first racial restriction via the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, when it barred the 
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entry of Chinese laborers; more severe restrictions on Chinese immigration continued 
through 1904.90 
Limits on immigrants of particular national origins continued in the first part of the 
twentieth century. An influx of nearly 13 million immigrants from 1900 to 1914 prompted 
xenophobic public responses and immigration policies, particularly against southern and 
eastern Europeans, Asians, and Middle-Easterners.91 This period of restrictions led to the 
adoption of a national-origins quota system in 1921: between 1921 and 1929, Congress 
established a quota of immigration visas each year for each sending nation that was 
proportional to the nationality’s presence in the United States in 1920.92 However, by 
1929, immigration was virtually halted because of the job shortage caused by the Great 
Depression.93 Notably, immigrants from the Western Hemisphere were not subject to any 
of these limitations or quotas.94 
Additionally, the geo-political atmosphere of war affected U.S. immigration 
policies. During World War II, the United States and Mexico adopted the Bracero Program, 
which allowed for the open travel of Mexican laborers in response to U.S. shortages. In 
1943, when China joined the war effort, the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed. 
Moreover, after the war, the United States passed the Displaced Persons Act of 1948; this 
was the country’s first refugee legislation and it gave special consideration to individuals 
persecuted by the Nazis to immigrate and/or become legal residents.95 Later, as Cold War 
tensions rose, changes in immigration policy reflected the ideological battle between 
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communism and capitalism. Domestically, the fear of subversion led to the adoption of the 
Internal Security Act of 1950, which required aliens to register addresses annually.96 At 
the same time, immigration policy also became more welcoming of immigrants fleeing 
communism, as with the Refugee Relief Act, which authorized the admission of 
immigrants escaping Iron Curtain countries.97  
Changes in American society paved the way for the liberalization of immigration 
policy in the 1960s. In the context of the Civil Rights Movement, a growing domestic 
economy, and the responsibility of American global power, the 1965 Immigration and 
Nationality Act ended the national-origins quota system.98 The new law set immigrant 
admission on the basis of relationship to a U.S. citizen, resident, or employer.99 This law 
replaced the quotas for individual countries with a cumulative quota for the total number 
of immigrants accepted each year but placed no admission limits on the members of a U.S. 
citizen’s nuclear family.100 Still, despite the law’s claims of non-discrimination on the 
basis of sex, nationality, race, or place of residence or birth, it included several exceptions 
to the rule: an annual cap of 170,000 visas for Eastern Hemisphere countries, allowing up 
to 20,000 from each country, and the first-ever cap on migration from the Western 
Hemisphere, set at 120,000.101  
Since the 1965 immigration reform, multiple changes have refined immigration 
laws, particularly those applying to the Western Hemisphere. In 1966, Congress passed the 
Cuban Adjustment Act, which allowed Cubans who had been in the United States as 
refugees to obtain residency.102 Moreover, by 1976, Congress had extended the 20,000-
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visa limit per country to the Western Hemisphere, but by 1980 it combined worldwide visa 
quotas to 270,000 annually.103 Subsequently, the Refugee Act of 1980, which allocated 
50,000 refugee visas annually, set refugees apart from the broader immigration quota 
system.104 The Act removed the ideological and geographic parameters of previous 
refugees law and defined a refugee as a person outside their country of nationality who is 
“unable or unwilling to return to that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or particular opinion.”105 Within this definition, differences between refugees and 
asylees are of particular importance: qualification as a refugee from afar does not guarantee 
legal admission into the United States, and an asylee is one who requests permission to 
stay as refugees from within the United States; notably, the United States does not establish 
quotas for asylees, as they are designed to be a flexible tool for Presidents to respond to 
international crises.106 Given the enormous response in the Western Hemisphere to the 
refugee program—triple the annual quota entered the United States from Cuba in 1980—
by 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) aimed to reduce illegal 
immigration by restricting such immigrants’ opportunities for employment and providing 
a path to legalization after a year.107 These challenges were further addressed in the 1990 
Immigration Act, which increased the number of legal admissions, reducing backlogs of 
applications and accommodating beneficiaries of the 1986 Act, as well as undocumented 
Salvadorans in the U.S.108 
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Despite the successive immigration restrictions set by Congress, U.S. presidents 
have preferred to maintain flexibility in the process. Presidents Rutherford Hayes, Grover 
Cleveland, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, and Harry Truman all attempted to 
veto the immigration acts passed during their administrations.109 Their reluctance to codify 
immigration limitations in law stemmed from their interest in using immigration as a 
foreign policy tool.110 However, since 1875, when Congress established itself as the 
primary actor in immigration regulation, presidents who have used immigration in 
international relations have had to work within and around the existing laws or work with 
Congress to create new ones.111 For instance, since the post-1965 limitations, refugee 
policy has been an area where foreign policy concerns continue to influence immigration 
policy because the program is administered by the executive branch, with modest 
Congressional input.112  Both the growth of presidential power and of U.S. global 
influence have given the president discretion over issues he deemed to be of national 
interest.113  
B. CONTEXT: U.S. POLICY FOR CUBAN IMMIGRATION  
The aforementioned considerations and dynamics came together in the case of 
Cuba; at the height of the Cold War in the early 1960s, foreign policy exerted major 
influence over U.S. immigration policy toward Cuba.114 After the Cuban Revolution of 
1959, the United States enacted a series of policies and legislation that not only encouraged 
but also facilitated Cuban immigration. This pattern began with the Eisenhower 
administration and persisted through the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, yielding 
an almost continuous policy of Cuban exceptionalism for the entirety of the 1960s. The 
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scope of this immigration posture stems from America’s Cold War battles: U.S. 
immigration policy toward Cuba was a strategic and ideological foreign policy tool against 
communism and was intended as a temporary measure to undermine communism in the 
hemisphere.  
While U.S.–Cuba confrontation during the Cold War reached an apogee in the 
1960s, the countries’ tense relationship began in the previous century.115 Before the Cuban 
revolution, the relationship between the United States and Cuba was driven by intertwined 
economic interest, U.S. paternalism, and military interventions. However, significant shifts 
in U.S. foreign policy in the first decades of the twentieth century led to noninterventionist 
policies in Cuba, which required the United States to expand its foreign policy tools beyond 
military might to achieve its desired outcomes. Moreover, U.S. treatment of Cuba as a 
protectorate and its overall approach to the Western Hemisphere as an unrestricted special 
immigration area made Cuban immigration prior to the Cuban Revolution largely irrelevant 
to bilateral relations.116  
The 1959 Cuban Revolution heralded an uncertain time for U.S.–Cuban relations, 
eventually resulting in a decades-long adversarial posture. From the start of the revolution, 
Washington believed Fidel Castro’s 26th of July movement was nationalistic, anti-
imperialist, and anti-dictatorial, but not communist.117 Nonetheless, the United States was 
leery of Castro and communicated with embattled dictator Fulgencio Batista in its attempts 
to negotiate a peaceful transfer of power to a five-man junta; Batista refused the 
proposal.118 In the months prior to Batista’s fall, mounting suspicions that communists had 
infiltrated Castro’s movement led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to express his desire 
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for a “third force” beyond Batista or Castro to emerge in Cuba.119 However, a third force 
never materialized, and as Castro’s movement triumphed, by January of 1959, the United 
States was left to sort out its position vis-à-vis the new Cuban regime.120 
Throughout 1959, the United States adopted a “wait and see” approach to Cuba’s 
new government, eventually adopting a policy aimed at the overthrow of Castro. Cuban 
actions and U.S. intelligence indicated to American policymakers that Cuba fostered anti-
American sentiment and supported revolutions throughout the region—that it tolerated 
communism in its government and sought to damage American economic interests by 
establishing a statist economy.121  Consequently, despite a lack of concrete proof that 
communists controlled Cuba, in the fall of 1959, President Eisenhower made the 
“fundamental decision to isolate and destroy the Cuban revolutionary government.”122  
By early 1960, Cuba had established economic and military ties to the Soviet 
Union, prompting the United States to pursue plans for the overthrow of the Castro regime. 
In March 1960, President Eisenhower approved the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) 
covert plans for using Cuban exiles in the United States to infiltrate the island and foment 
a counter-revolution.123 During the remainder of the 1960s, the United States engaged in 
tit-for-tat exchanges: Cuba undertook agrarian land reforms and nationalized U.S.-owned 
industries, and the United States responded by eliminating preferences for Cuban sugar 
imports and prohibiting U.S. exports to the island.124 Neither country gained an edge on 
the other. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, the United States was employing 
multiple policy tools—covert action, diplomacy, and economic power—in its attempts to 
isolate and overthrow Cuba.  
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President John F. Kennedy not only continued Eisenhower’s anti-Castro policies 
but also intensified them. Shortly before Kennedy assumed the presidency, the United 
States severed diplomatic ties with Cuba.125 Given the elimination of diplomatic tools and 
the ineffectiveness of economic pressures, Kennedy’s administration intensified covert 
action plans against Castro.126 Moreover, Kennedy demonstrated a fixation with “the Cuba 
problem” early in his Presidency, including concern for the spread of Castro’s revolution 
in Latin America; when presented with the CIA plot for an exile expedition, the plan 
consumed his attention and he sought to ensure its success and plausible deniability for the 
United States.127 When he launched the doomed Bay of Pigs invasion, in mid-April 1961, 
the fiasco not only embarrassed the United States but also increased anti-Americanism on 
the island and further radicalized the Castro regime, creating a fear of future U.S. invasion 
that pushed them further toward alliance with the Soviet Union for self-preservation.128 In 
May 1961, Castro publicly declared a socialist revolution in Cuba and by late 1961 declared 
himself a Marxist-Leninist.129  
The undeterred Kennedy administration intensified its efforts to overthrow and 
isolate Castro through new covert actions, economic and diplomatic pressures, and anti-
Castro propaganda. The CIA recruited Cuban exiles in Miami and enacted Operation 
Mongoose to sow disorder on the island and innovate assassination plots against Castro, 
and Kennedy established an embargo on Cuban imports and rallied the Organization of 
American States to oust Cuba.130 These pressures crippled Cuba’s economy: debts grew, 
factories closed, tourism and foreign capital dissipated, and an emigration “brain drain” 
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took place, all of which strengthened Cuba’s political centralization and its economic ties 
to the Soviet Union.131  
By 1963, Kennedy realized the hardline approach to Cuba had not been fruitful and 
decided to pursue a simultaneous, short-lived, and secret effort at rapprochement with 
Castro. Prior to 1963, rapprochement dialogue with Castro was not a politically viable 
option, given Kennedy’s repeated antagonisms toward Cuba and the domestic support for 
such a stance.132 Instead, dialogue was limited to “specific, narrow issues of mutual 
interest;”133 these included failed negotiations to release Bay of Pigs prisoners in 1961 and 
1962, covert communications via Brazil during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 that were 
rendered irrelevant when the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw from Cuba, and successful 
prisoner exchange negotiations in late 1962.134 These smaller-scale negotiations, coupled 
with Kennedy’s reflection on failures of his Cuba policies and Castro’s disillusionment 
with the Soviet Union during the missile crisis, paved the way for rapprochement dialogue 
in 1963.135 By this time, Castro made it publicly known that he was ready to pursue 
rapprochement and Kennedy was ready to get passed what his brother called, “the Cuban 
mess.”136 Because there was disagreement within the administration, the dialogue was 
kept a secret to all but the participants, and with the assassination of Kennedy, the 
immediate possibility of normalized relations disappeared.137  
In addition to its geopolitical impacts, the 1959 Cuban Revolution marked Cuba’s 
shift from a migrant-receiving to a migrant-sending society.138 The 1959 regime change 
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in Cuba simultaneously pushed 73,724 objectors out of Cuba, and inspired the return of 
some 26,000 Cubans living abroad—yielding Cuba a net migration gain of 12,345 
people.139 Only 26,527 Cubans immigrated to the United States, indicating that over 65 
percent of Cuban emigrants relocated to countries other than the United States.140 This 
data indicates that the revolution alone did not prompt the mass migration of Cubans to the 
United States, which took place in the 1960s. 
Between 1958 and 1970, the nearly 500,000 Cuban migrants to the United States 
were composed of distinct sub-groups, each of which influenced U.S.–Cuban relations in 
a different way. The five subgroups generally included the inner-circle of Batista in 1958, 
the upper-class exodus fleeing property confiscation in 1959, the “brain drain” of 
professionals and anti-communists in 1960–1961, middle-class technicians and workers in 
1962, and the “freedom flight” working-class and the families of prior exiles in 1965.141 
Until the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, these Cuban refugees believed their exile would be 
temporary—that they would return home when the United States overthrew Castro.142  
Beginning in 1959, the influx of anti-Castro Cubans in the United States engaged 
in subversive actions against the Cuban regime. In fact, in October 1959, President 
Eisenhower directed departments and agencies to “stop the activities of 
counterrevolutionaries working out of Florida”143 because the State Department 
determined that the anti-Castro activities of Cuban exiles were “highly prejudicial to our 
relations with Cuba.”144 The CIA later developed a plan to train Cuban exiles for 
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subversion, which President Eisenhower approved in March 1960.145 Thus, the change in 
Cuba’s regime provoked the initial exodus, and to pursue the President’s policy of 
overthrowing Castro, the CIA capitalized on the ongoing activities of the exile groups. 
By 1961, the U.S. realized the potential ideological value of not only the Cuban 
exiles but of immigration policy as a foreign policy tool against the Castro regime. Within 
a week of his inauguration, President Kennedy expressed concern for the immense influx 
of Cuban refugees and the Castro policy of leaving them penniless before departure; his 
administration established the Cuban Refugee Program to facilitate their settlement in the 
United States using Mutual Assistance Act funds—a continuation of the Marshall Plan, but 
to fight communist expansion.146 Moreover, in a statement to the Soviet government after 
the 1961 Bay of Pigs embarrassment, Kennedy cited the refugee flow as evidence of 
“growing resistance to the Castro dictatorship” and of refugees’ hope to “assist their fellow 
Cubans in the struggle for freedom.”147 In this statement, Kennedy established the 
ideological and strategic value of Cuban migration to the broader fight against not just 
Cuba, but communism.148 In his view, welcoming Cubans provided a twofold benefit to 
the United States: it both demonstrated the superiority of American democracy to Soviet 
communism and provided a strategic tool to overthrow Castro and render the migration a 
temporary phenomenon.149  
Accordingly, the Kennedy administration “promoted virtually unrestricted 
migration from Cuba” to delegitimize the Castro regime until the 1962 Cuban missile crisis 
prompted the blockade of the island and halted commercial flights.150 After the 1962 crisis, 
the United States expanded the Cuban embargo to include commercial flights in and out of 
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Cuba as part of its policy to isolate the regime.151 While this policy sacrificed the 
ideological value of the 1961 migrations, it set the precedent for using the decade’s 
enduring migration streams as leverage in U.S.–Castro relations. 
In 1965, after the three-year hiatus in legal migration because of the missile crisis, 
Castro coerced President Johnson into renewing unrestricted migration from Cuba. Castro 
perceived the hiatus as a U.S. effort to facilitate an internal uprising by the hundreds of 
thousands of Cubans who had been approved for visas but could not physically depart the 
island.152 Because this population caused turmoil for Castro’s regime and the counter-
revolution had been defeated, Castro decided to open a port and invite Cuban Americans 
to pick up their relatives by boat.153 Castro’s actions were aimed not only at benefitting 
his domestic politics but also at embarrassing the United States by forcing a change in its 
migration policy. Undeterred, President Johnson spun the challenge to his favor by 
appealing to the ideological value of immigration as Kennedy had before him:154 Johnson 
publicly declared American “tradition as an asylum for the oppressed is going to be upheld 
… [we] will welcome these Cuban people” and commenced an airlift, referred to as 
“freedom flights,” that endured until 1973 and the Nixon Administration.155 America’s 
ideologically-driven Cuban immigration policy in the 1960s relieved Castro of his 
unwanted political dissidents and helped to stabilize his regime, working against the U.S. 
strategic objective of overthrowing the Cuban regime.156 
The fraught U.S.–Cuba relationship of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
unfolded in multiple foreign policy realms: military and paramilitary, economics, overt and 
covert diplomacy, and immigration. When the 1959 Cuban revolution challenged U.S. 
capitalist hegemony with a communist threat 90 miles from its coast, the consistent policy 
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of American Presidents for the following decade became the isolation and overthrow of the 
Castro regime. This contentious relationship created both opportunities and challenges 
when spontaneous and Castro-induced migrations from the island took place. In both cases, 
the United States responded by employing immigration policy as part of its broader foreign 
policy toward Cuba—to win the ideological battle with communism by demonstrating the 
Cuban people’s preference for democracy and to utilize Cuban exiles for the overthrow of 
Cuba’s communist regime.  
Thus, the United States chose to encourage Cuban migration in the 1960s because 
it expected the measure would promote its ideological and strategic policies against 
communism and the Castro regime. Moreover, because policymakers believed the 
immigration policy would help the United States achieve its policy goals, Cuban migration 
would be temporary and resolve itself when the refugees returned to Cuba. While the 
benefit of hindsight reveals the optimism and hubris of such an expectation, for the U.S. 
administrations of the 1960s, it would be difficult to conceive the scale and duration of the 
Cuban exodus, much less the longevity of the Castro regime. 
Since that time, Cuban migration has continued, yielding over 1 million Cuban 
immigrants as of 2017.157 The continuous flow of Cuban migrants is punctuated by three 
distinct surges: the 1980 Mariel boatlift, the 1994 balseros, and the post-2014 
normalization-era exodus. In each of these waves, the bilateral relations of the United 
States and Cuba have prompted the surge in migration and the policy response within the 
United States has varied, particularly since the 1980 Refugee Act decoupled ideology from 
refugee status, turning increasingly restrictionist. 
The 1980 Mariel boatlift was prompted by Cuba, echoing the 1965 episode that 
superseded U.S. immigration policy: Castro opened the Mariel harbor and welcomed 
Cuban-Americans to pick up their relatives by boat.158 At the time, Cuba was experiencing 
a recession and increased political discontent, thus the policy’s intent was to purge the 
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country of what Castro called, “antisocial elements, lumpen and scum.”159 Indeed, the 
Mariel boatlift transferred what Dominguez estimates were 8,000 “common criminals” 
straight from prisons in Cuba to the United States; he also notes that about 45 percent of 
the 124,769 marielitos that arrived in the United States had prison records.160 In response 
to Castro, President Jimmy Carter continued the pattern of welcoming the Cubans based 
on his personal convictions and the dangers of physically interfering with the boatlift, 
although he acknowledged the “boatlift was contrary to U.S. law and policy.”161 Carter’s 
position was not domestically popular, even he recognized his decision hurt his reelection 
campaign, and while the Cubans were admitted into the United States, they were not 
granted the refugee status and benefits of their predecessors, instead they were deemed 
“entrants.”162 During this episode of Cuban migration, it became clear to policy-makers 
that America’s welcoming immigration policy was beneficial to Castro’s regime, 
politically damaging domestically, and that the U.S. policy had to reduce the incentives for 
further migration, leading—for the first time—to a restrictionist policy toward Cubans.163 
Under Ronald Reagan, migration became the primary concern for relations between 
Cuba and the United States. In 1981, marielitos deemed excludable from admission into 
the United States were processed for deportation, but Castro refused to accept them; in 
response, Reagan halted immigrant visa processing until Castro acquiesced, albeit without 
direct negotiations for the first four years of Reagan’s administration.164 However, by 
1984, Reagan decided to make marielitos eligible for the benefits under the Cuban 
Adjustment of Status Act of 1966, which granted them the benefits they had been denied, 
and because those benefits were denied to the Haitians who simultaneously arrived under 
similar circumstances, reinstated the exceptionalism of Cuban immigration policy based 
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on anticommunism.165  Also in 1984, both countries signed a migration agreement that 
sought to normalize immigration flows, but Castro unilaterally ended it when the United 
States began sending radio broadcasts to the island; Reagan responded by preventing both 
immigrant and non-immigrant travel into the United States—this ultimately resulted in the 
reinstatement of the agreement in 1987.166  
As a consequence of this upheaval in and slow implementation of this new U.S. 
policy and domestic Cuban obstacles to emigration, Cuban migration from 1984 to 1989 
slowed, yielding about 3,000 Cubans per year in 1988 and 1989.167 However, by 1989 the 
rate of tourist visas issued to Cubans was five times higher than the year before and 
continued to rise in 1990, which combined with the U.S. government decision not to 
prosecute those who overstayed their visas created an avenue to bypass the official 
migration agreement between the two countries.168 Moreover, Cubans were increasingly 
using makeshift boats (balsas) to reach the Florida coast; in the mid-1980s, the U.S. Coast 
Guard rescued 20 to 60 Cubans a year while they attempted that trip, but by 1991 the 
number rose to 2,203.169  
These conditions paved the way for the 1994 balsero crisis, which Castro instigated 
as a coercive measure against its perceived reluctance of the United States to conduct 
normal immigration proceedings for Cubans, as agreed upon in 1987.170 In August 1994 
as indications of another Cuban mass migration surfaced—what had been dozens of 
seafaring Cubans before 1989 became thousands after 1991, and tens of thousands in mid-
1994—President Bill Clinton decided and publicly declared U.S. plans to interdict Cubans 
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at sea and return them to the U.S. base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba indefinitely.171 While 
the intent of that policy was certainly to discourage Cubans from making the journey, the 
numbers indicate neither the policy nor the hazards effectively dissuaded potential 
balseros: in the summer of 1994, interdiction reached a one-month high of 30,900, despite 
a 75 percent death rate at sea.172 Castro, unpleased with other U.S. actions against Cuba—
namely the embargo and Radio Martí—removed obstacles to Cuban emigration by sea in 
an effort to force dialogue with the United States on these and immigration issues of 
concern.173 Ultimately, bilateral talks yielded an agreement that included provisions for 
20,000 Cuban admissions to the United States per year, with no limits on those with U.S. 
citizen relatives, and issuance of visas for the 4,000-6,000 Cubans on waiting lists, plus a 
lottery system for future applicants, both of which ended the short-lived possibility for 
illegal Cuban immigration; additionally, Cuba agreed to crack-down on illegal emigration 
and accept some repatriations.174 This agreement would come to be known as the “wet-
foot, dry-foot” policy, whereby Cubans interdicted at sea would be returned to Cuba, but 
those arriving on U.S. soil could remain and apply for asylum. Ultimately, the Clinton-era 
migration agreements allowed Cubans multiple avenues for legal status in the United 
States: refugee admissions, family-reunification, visa lotteries, asylum, and eventual 
permanent residency after one year under the Cuban Adjustment Act.175 In the late 1990s 
and into the 2000s, Cuban balseros exchanged their makeshift rafts for motorized boats 
operated by Caribbean migrant smugglers; but when compared to the authorized rates of 
legal migration the numbers of sea arrivals in the United States remained low.176 
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From 1995 onward, Cuban immigration flow has remained continuous and mostly 
legal, but in 2014 President Barack Obama’s shift toward normalization of relations with 
Cuba prompted another surge in unauthorized migration. After decades of a continuous 
policy on Cuba, President Obama reversed the U.S. position incrementally: in December 
2014, he announced his initiative to normalize relations with Cuba; in July 2015, he 
resumed diplomatic ties; in March 2016, he met with Cuban President Raul Castro; and in 
January 2017, he ended the “wet foot/dry foot” policy declaring, “effective immediately, 
Cuban nationals who attempt to enter the United States illegally and do not qualify for 
humanitarian relief will be subject to removal.”177 The initial 2014 announcement 
provoked a rush of Cuban immigrants—anticipating an end to their exceptional 
immigration status—to enter the United States: in a quarter-to-quarter comparison, Pew 
Research indicated the arrival of Cubans doubled from 2014 to 2015, and from 2015 to 
2016 the numbers increased by 85 percent.178 However, this time Cubans added land 
routes by flying to Ecuador and traversing through Central America to the United 
States.179 As a result of this movement, in 2016, Nicaragua shut its borders creating a 
southbound domino effect of stranded Cubans in Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia, 
which prompted each country to address the hundreds to thousands of migrants within their 
borders, namely through deportation back to Cuba.180 In 2018, new challenges emerged 
to the standing bilateral migration agreement: cutbacks to U.S. Embassy personnel in 
Havana have prompted the suspension of visa services in Cuba. Instead, the U.S. Embassy 
in Bogota took over responsibility for the Cuban visa process, requiring Cubans to travel 
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to Colombia for the prospect of an American visa.181 The most recent developments in 
United States-Cuban relations officially ended the Cold War-era special status conferred 
to Cuban migrants, but the future of near-term bilateral relations remains uncertain under 
President Donald Trump and new Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel. 
C. CONTEXT: U.S. POLICY FOR SALVADORAN IMMIGRATION   
Near the end of the Cold War, the American experience with communist Cuba 
heavily influenced U.S. immigration policy toward El Salvador. Here, too, immigration 
policy was a strategic and foreign policy tool against communism; however, in contrast for 
its reverse of the Cuban case, the whole-scale rejection of refugees and asylees from El 
Salvador in the early 1980s communicated to the world that the U.S. supported the 
Salvadoran regime in their war against communist insurgency. While U.S. support for the 
Salvadoran military junta began under the Carter administration in 1979, the Reagan 
administration expanded its support to El Salvador’s government, fearing the spread of 
communist revolution in Central America and a subsequent mass migration to the United 
States. Thus, hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans were summarily denied entry and 
categorized as “economic migrants,” with few admitted under the 1980 Refugee Act, 
resulting in a flow of illegal migration and pattern of precarious legal status for Salvadoran 
émigrés in the United States.  
To understand the connection between these issues requires understanding the 
relationship between the United States and Central America. The United States has been a 
dominant influence in Central America for nearly 200 years, and, as in most places in Latin 
America, it has since then invariably pursued its interests related to national security, 
domestic politics, and economic development.182 Prior to the Cold War, this hegemonic 
relationship sought direct American advantage in commercial interests and stability in 
Central America, leading to U.S. interventions. During the Cold War, Kennedy’s push for 
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development was overcome by anti-communist efforts to stabilize the region through 
covert action and military aid, particularly in Central America. The United States perceived 
anti-communism in Central America as its vital interest: as noted by President Reagan in 
1983, “the national security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America. If we cannot 
defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would 
collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be put in 
jeopardy.”183 In short, the primary U.S. foreign policy toward El Salvador was the 
promotion of democracy and ending the communist threat. 
These vital U.S. interests were at stake in El Salvador’s 1979 civil war, which 
remains among the world’s most violent and long-lasting conflicts; it caused countless 
human rights atrocities from right-wing paramilitaries and leftist guerillas and displaced 
hundreds of thousands of people.184 The insurgency in El Salvador began in the context of 
40 years of military rule and a major economic crisis. At the outset, and with the military 
as El Salvador’s strongest institution, five separate revolutionary groups emerged; fearing 
a rebellion, junior elements of the military overthrew the government and established a 
civilian junta.185 By 1980, political conflict within the junta’s left- and right-wing 
representatives caused the junta to dissolve, bisecting the country into opposite ends of the 
political spectrum: the military and oligarchy on the right and the poor and communists on 
the left.186  With help from Cuba, leftist guerillas united to form the Farabundo Martí 
Liberation Front (FMLN) and received training and assistance from Cuba, Nicaragua, and 
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the Soviet Union.187 In response, the United States sought to support a centrist junta and 
its economic and security sector reforms.188 
Under the Carter administration, aid and military support for the junta was 
contingent upon respect for human rights and maintaining a centrist junta, but by 1981 this 
position became untenable for the United States. With the election of Ronald Reagan in 
late 1980, Salvadoran leaders changed their calculus: they believed the aid would flow 
without conditions.189 Then, in the last days of the Carter administration, the FMLN 
conducted simultaneous attacks throughout the country in what was dubbed their “final 
offensive.”190 The initial success of this offensive prompted Carter to lift human rights 
conditions from U.S. assistance, a position continued by the Reagan administration, albeit 
with enhanced aid.191 
In providing El Salvador with unconditional and enhanced military aid, the United 
States facilitated countless human rights abuses against the populace and stimulated 
sustained emigration. While the Reagan administration did desire a reduction in human 
rights violations, it attempted to induce rather than coerce compliance.192 By late 1981, 
this approach yielded the largest massacre of the war: in El Mozote, American trained 
forces tortured and killed 767 people, including children, over the course of three days.193 
The subsequent years of the war pitted the poorly trained Salvadoran conventional military 
against a flexible guerilla force, with the civilian population caught in between. Military 
commanders believed that innocent civilians would flee areas of insurgent control, thus 
                                                 




190 Ibid., 117. 
191 Ibid., 119. 
192 Ibid., 120. 
193 Ibid., 121. 
 42 
those that remained merited the violence that befell them.194 By 1992, about 70–75,000 
Salvadorans lost their lives and over one million fled the country.195 
The longevity of El Salvador’s war forced President Reagan to respond 
simultaneously to the conflict and the ensuing flow of migrants. In a 1983 bid for 
Congressional support for aid to El Salvador, Reagan remarked, “must we wait while 
Central Americans are driven from their homes like the…more than a million Cubans who 
have fled Castro’s Caribbean utopia? Must we, by default, leave the people of El Salvador 
no choice but to flee their homes, creating another tragic human exodus?”196 President 
Reagan’s concerns were aptly placed, whereas the flow of migrants from El Salvador to 
the United States was largely non-existent in the late 1970s, by 1984, ten percent of El 
Salvador’s population was living in the United States.197 However, the President’s words 
incorrectly predicted the cause of the migration—he suggested that if communism won it 
would create an exodus, but the exodus was generated by the protracted and 
indiscriminately violent war his administration was funding.  
Despite the clear link between the war and the surge in migration, the Reagan 
administration made no effort to welcome Salvadorans in the United States—it promoted 
policies against their admission. Although Salvadorans fled their country as a result of 
inseparable motivations--war, economic necessity, and personal fears of persecution—they 
were never deemed a national group eligible for refugee admission.198 Instead of providing 
asylum, the Reagan administration argued the solution to the migrant crisis was to pacify 
El Salvador and declared that the continued provision of military aid was an indication that 
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human rights were improving.199 While those claims are debatable, given the U.S. 
acknowledgement of and aid to Salvadoran refugees outside the United States and the 
subjective nature of the asylum assessments, in that political climate, even congressmen 
had difficulty in finding recourse for Salvadoran asylum opportunities.200 
In addition to foreign policy constraints, the Refugee Act of 1980 and the continued 
flow of Cuban migrants worked in concert against Salvadoran asylum opportunities. 
Because the 1980 Refugee Act eliminated ideology and particular country designations for 
refugee status, the law tasked the administration with establishing regional ceilings for 
admission.201 Once those regional ceilings were set, the administration selected groups of 
“special humanitarian concern” or “national interest” for admission consideration.202 
These decisions did not favor Salvadorans, for the aforementioned political reasons, and 
because most of the 1980s quotas for Latin America were reserved for Cubans, who were 
designated an eligible “national group;” in 1980, for instance, 95 percent of the 20,000 
slots were given to Cubans.203 While these quotas ebbed and flowed with the bilateral 
relations of the United States and Cuba, throughout the 1980s Salvadorans were not granted 
refugee status, with few exceptions: 67 in 1983, 3 in 1985, and 11 in 1989.204 In 1983, the 
Reagan administration admitted 50 Salvadoran political prisoners and their families 
following a special request from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR).205 The small number admitted the other two years likely reflect similar 
exceptions.206 
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Without a clear path to legal entry, Salvadorans resorted to entering the United 
States illegally. By mid-1985, estimates of Salvadoran migrants living in the United States 
ranged from 1,054,000 to 1,743,000.207 Within these numbers, the majority is not 
accounted for in legal migration statistics, which showed negligible immigration before 
1979 and amounts to only 34,267 immigrant visas granted to Salvadorans from 1979 to 
1985.208 Combined with the low numbers admitted as refugees (70) and asylees (756) 
from 1983 to 1985, these estimates reflect a considerable flow of illegal immigration during 
the first half of the Salvadoran civil war.209  
Because of U.S. involvement in El Salvador’s civil war, Salvadorans who either 
overstayed non-immigrant visas or entered the country illegally through 1985 had few 
opportunities to normalize their immigration status. At the time, these Salvadorans could 
apply to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), known today as U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), for asylum; those who applied upon arrival 
were regarded favorably as “affirmative” applicants and those who applied upon 
apprehension for illegal entry were deemed “defensive” applicants.210 While INS 
processed their applications, affirmative applicants were normally released on “good 
faith,” whereas defensive applicants were generally detained.211 Adhering to the 1980 
Refugee Act, the INS consulted with the Department of State for advisory opinions on 
applicant’s claims of persecution, and in practice tended to follow those opinions for 
approval or rejection.212 In the case of Salvadorans, applications were overwhelmingly 
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rejected—2 percent were approved in 1984 and 2.4 percent in 1985.213 Given the 
Department of State’s heavy influence on these judgments, foreign policy considerations—
foreign aid to the Salvadoran junta contingent upon human rights progress—was arguably 
the source of these judgments.214 
Without legal protections nor foreign policy favor in the early 1980s, 
undocumented Salvadorans were targeted for deportation and inspired the sympathy of a 
domestic sanctuary movement. In 1980, of the 11,762 Salvadorans apprehended, 75 
percent were deported; in 1981, 67 percent of the 15,903 apprehended Salvadorans were 
deported.215 The high numbers of Salvadorans apprehended, coupled with the refusal to 
allow them out on bond and reports of intimidation practices garnered the attention of the 
immigration groups and lawyers.216 These groups decried unfair treatment of Salvadorans, 
including specific complaints about their access to information and lawyers.217 By 1982, 
religious organizations took note of the Salvadoran plight and offered them sanctuary from 
the deportations.218 Among those groups, in Arizona, the first church to openly declare its 
opposition to U.S. policy declared federal treatment of Salvadorans was “illegal and 
immoral.”219 While harboring undocumented immigrants was a crime, the INS had an 
informal policy of not seeking individuals in places of worship.220 The movement spread 
and by 1984, “hundreds of churches, synagogues, ecclesiastical and secular communities 
… had declared themselves and their buildings to be sanctuaries.”221 Participants of the 
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movement provided Salvadorans with material, spiritual, and legal support to ease their 
difficulties, but also prompted grassroots political activism on their behalf.222 At the heart 
of this movement was the quest for a Salvadoran extended voluntary departure (EVD), a 
temporary measure granted by the Attorney General to halt apprehensions and deportations 
of a particular national group, but which did not come to pass in the 1980s.223  
In the midst of the sanctuary movement, Congress attempted to change deportation 
practices of Salvadorans, leading to amnesty for some in 1986. In 1983, members of 
Congress attempted to suspend the deportations of Salvadorans, citing widespread 
suffering as a result of the ongoing war.224 In disagreement, the Department of State 
responded that it would be inappropriate because it would encourage illegal migration, was 
unnecessary because Salvadorans seek asylum elsewhere in the region, and because it 
conflicted with the foreign policy of the time.225 Aside from the charity of the sanctuary 
movement, Salvadorans were not granted any reprieve of their illegality until 1986. After 
years of debates, Congress passed the IRCA of 1986, which granted amnesty to some 
undocumented immigrants—roughly 146,000, all of whom arrived prior to January 
1982.226 After this point, the legal status of Salvadorans has vacillated between temporary 
measures, but no further amnesty has been granted. 
While this helped the initial civil war migrants, it rendered hundreds of thousands 
of Salvadorans who arrived after this point deportable until 1987. The potential magnitude 
of the ensuing deportation of Salvadorans was so great that, in April 1987, Salvadoran 
President Napoleon Duarte requested President Reagan exempt them from the law and 
deportation; Duarte feared the economic impact of losing $350 to $600 million in 
remittances from those Salvadoran nationals.227 While the Reagan administration formally 
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rejected Duarte’s plea, “deportations of Salvadorans essentially ended” in practice; likely 
because the United States did not want to take actions counterproductive to its foreign 
policy aims in El Salvador.228  
By 1990, renewed immigration reform made Salvadorans in the United States the 
first beneficiaries of a new program called temporary protected status (TPS). Between 1987 
and 1990, Salvadorans continued to battle for EVD (known today as deferred enforced 
departure) opportunities but instead, as a result of sympathetic congressmen’s efforts, 
received a new status known as TPS in 1990, which granted working permits and stopped 
all deportations of those arriving before September 1990 for eighteen months.229 
Salvadorans were the first group to receive TPS—a congressionally authorized mechanism 
for providing a “form of humanitarian relief” to migrants from countries “embroiled in 
violent conflict or suffer[ing] from a natural disaster,” who are “unable to return to their 
home.”230 While TPS can be extended for designated periods of time, it is a temporary 
status that requires periodic applications to USCIS and political lobbying from 
beneficiaries to continue.231 The initial TPS for Salvadorans expired in 1992, when the 
Salvadoran civil war ended, but President George H.W. Bush then authorized the deferred 
enforced departure (DED), which prevented deportations of 190,000 Salvadorans without 
the need for their registration and continued to provide the opportunity for work permits 
with registration.232 Based on the assertion that a large repatriation would have “serious 
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negative effects…on the then evolving situation in El Salvador,” this authorization for 
DED was repeated by President Clinton in 1993, but finally allowed to expire in December 
1994, when “the political and human rights situation in El Salvador…improved 
significantly.”233  
The next major change in Salvadoran’s status occurred between 1998 and 2001, 
when a hurricane and pair of earthquakes devastated El Salvador and prompted the return 
of DED and prolonged TPS for Salvadorans. While some Salvadorans who arrived prior 
to 1990 (roughly 129,131) were provided the opportunity to “regularize their status” under 
the 1997 Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), 
unauthorized Salvadorans continued to arrive in the United States with INS estimates 
showing 335,000 unauthorized Salvadorans in 1996.234 Subsequently, from 1998 to 2001, 
approximately 150,000 Salvadorans who were already in the United States benefitted from 
two temporary deportation suspensions before receiving TPS designation from President 
George W. Bush.235 President Bush’s decision was made in part to Salvadoran President 
Francisco Flores’ in-person petition for TPS, in which he argued that the remittances of 
Salvadorans in the United States would help fund the affected families and the national 
recovery efforts.236 President Bush explained his rationale declaring the TPS would, 
“allow them to continue to work here and to remit some of their wages back home to 
support El Salvador’s recovery efforts.”237 Since that time, Presidents Bush and Obama 
consistently renewed the TPS, but under President Donald J. Trump, without plans for an 
extension the TPS for this group—roughly 262, 528 in 2017—is set to expire on September 
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9, 2019.238 Given the size (approximately 1.9 million in 2013) and long-term presence of 
Salvadorans in the United States, remittances have become central to El Salvador’s 
economy—amounting to 18.3 percent of its gross domestic product in 2017—and 
accordingly, to bilateral relations with the United States and domestic politics within El 
Salvador.239 
Immigration policy toward El Salvador in the 1980s was guided by foreign policy 
concerns, but also influenced by domestic political actors and the agency this gave to the 
Salvadoran community. Salvadorans were never granted refugee status as a national group, 
nor the package of benefits this conferred, because the United States perceived its support 
for the Salvadoran junta’s victory over communists as the solution to their temporary, but 
substantial migration flow. Moreover, despite indirect U.S. acknowledgement of the 
Salvadoran migrant’s plight, it was also constrained by the large number of Cubans who 
continued to flee communism and filled the available refugee allocations. Ultimately, 
because the United States believed its foreign policy goals would solve the Salvadoran 
immigration problem, the decades-long flow of refugees (in all but name) have yielded a 
contingent of hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants in precarious legal 
status in the United States for almost two decades. 
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III. CONTEXT OF RECEPTION 
The interaction between structural factors in the United States and the 
characteristics of immigrants entering the country shape the assimilation models of those 
initial immigrants and their subsequent generations.240 To understand how U.S. policy 
impacts their assimilation, a key mechanism is the context of reception, which this chapter 
will explore for the initial waves of migration from Cuba and El Salvador. The context of 
reception refers to the structural factors in the reception environment that constrain 
immigrants: 1) government responses; 2) economic conditions; 3) societal attitudes; and 4) 
the presence of ethnic communities.241 These dimensions reflect the economic, social, 
political, and legal aspects of the reception context and underscore the influence of the 
federal government’s policies—driven by its overarching foreign policy goals—in each 
area. In the case of Miami-based Cubans, U.S. policy generated a welcoming reception 
context that facilitated their economic and social integration—albeit with latent racial 
tensions—and Cubans’ creation of an ethnic community with a strong exile identity. 
Salvadorans in Los Angeles experienced a negative reception: U.S. immigration policy and 
support for the Salvadoran military junta necessitated the exclusion of Salvadoran refugees, 
limited their economic opportunities, contributed to negative societal attitudes, and divided 
the ethnic community, but also sparked some activism in civil society. 
This study’s emphasis on the reception context does not negate the importance of 
the interaction between human capital and each of the structural factors. However, because 
the purpose of this research is to understand how U.S. foreign policy shapes the structural 
constraints under which an immigrant makes choices about life in the United States, the 
discussion of American foreign policy’s influence on human capital in these countries is 
not the emphasis of this research. In fact, Portes and Rumbaut, in their fourth edition of 
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Immigrant America, found that while assimilation stems from the interaction between 
human capital and reception contexts, immigrants with similar skillsets may be directed 
toward divergent socioeconomic positions by the receiving environment.242 They add that 
analyzing the elements of the context of reception “is a way to overcome the limitations of 
individualistic models of immigrant achievement.”243 
The first element of the reception context, and on which U.S. foreign policy exerts 
particular influence, is the government response. Government responses determine the 
flow and form of migration, whether authorized or not, and can be understood as: exclusive, 
passively accepting, or actively encouraging.244 Exclusion can preclude immigration or 
create illegal migration flows; active encouragement either induces particular migration or 
assists in resettlement; and passive acceptance exists between the previous two 
possibilities, where the government is permissive about migration but does not 
facilitate it.245 
Second, economic conditions refers to the labor opportunities available to migrants, 
as constrained and shaped by U.S. policy. This includes regional economic health, existing 
wage inequalities, and labor demands faced by all residents of an area, but adds the 
typification—positive, negative, or neutral—of specific immigrant groups.246 Negative 
typification refers to discrimination that limits immigrants to low-wage labor or confines 
them to unemployment. Conversely, positive typification can occur in ethnic enclaves with 
preferential hiring of “their own” or in a broader setting, through stereotypes of a particular 
group’s disposition to “work hard.”247  
Third, the societal attitudes toward particular immigrant groups play an important 
role in the characterization of the reception context and are influenced by U.S. foreign 
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policy and immigration considerations.248 This includes the public’s attitudes in the United 
States as demonstrated in the media, local interactions, and national narratives of particular 
immigrant groups.249 These attitudes can be classified as positive, negative, mixed, or 
neutral. They may be consistent or divergent in the national and local environments 
Fourth, the local presence of an ethnic community that a given immigrant group 
perceives as similar to themselves is central to their reception context and can be a source 
of support but can also inhibit assimilation into the mainstream. If there is no pre-existing 
ethnic community, immigrants rely on their human capital—their existing personal 
resource endowments—and the other factors of the reception context may play a greater 
role in their integration.250 When an ethnic community exists, it influences new 
immigrants’ integration by providing a support network for cultural differences and 
economic challenges.251 However, when the ethnic community is generally working-class, 
their assistance is generally contingent on new immigrants’ conformity to the community’s 
economic status.252 On the other hand, when an ethnic community has access to higher 
paying professions, new immigrants may have more options for employment both within 
and outside of their community.253 
The following discussion on the context of reception focuses on “the opportunity 
structure, degree of openness versus hostility, and acceptance”254 experienced by two 
separate waves of migration: Cubans in Miami and Salvadorans in Los Angeles.  The 
characteristics of the immigrant groups, while not the main focus of this analysis, provide 
supplemental context for their experience in the United States. Thus, it is necessary to 
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survey the demographics, legal status, size, and timing of the first-wave diasporas while 
also characterizing the context of reception nationally and the local conditions in Miami 
and Los Angeles at the approximate years of the diasporas’ arrival. Moreover, given that 
early migrants’ experiences in the host society are decisive for subsequent migrants’ 
experiences, the lingering legacy of the reception context affects later Cuban and 
Salvadoran migrants as well. 255  
A. CUBANS IN 1960s MIAMI 
Based on the contextual factors described in the previous chapters, as they relate to 
the overall reception of the initial wave of Cuban migrants to the United States, this wave 
of “Golden Exiles” includes those arriving between January 1959 and September 1965. 
These approximately 304,070 Cubans256 share common structural experiences, as they 
were “pushed” out of Cuba because of its communist regime and “pulled” to the United 
States by its welcoming foreign policy, preferential immigration stance, and historical ties 
between the two nations. Moreover, because initial waves of refugees tend to represent the 
upper segments of a society, this cohort of Cubans include a disproportionate number of 
well-educated, upper-class professionals and entrepreneurs, then giving way to a large 
middle class as early as between 1962 and 1965; they were also mostly white.257 The 
earliest exiles during this period were tied to the old Batista regime: politicians, high-
ranking military officers, and government leaders; they were followed by the upper class 
who were negatively affected by the socioeconomic changes in Cuba, and later the middle 
class: artisans, office and factory workers, skilled/semi-skilled workers.258 Among exile 
arrivals from 1959 to 1962 and 1962 to 1965, the percentage of professional, technical and 
managerial Cubans dropped from 31 to 18.1 percent, but the number of semi-skilled and 
unskilled Cubans increased from 8 to 49 percent.259 Politically, this group of exiles was 
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also varied, including Batista supporters, former Castro supporters, apathetic Cubans, and 
anti-communists.260  
Thus, the Cuban exiles leading up to the September 1965 Freedom Flights shared 
a relatively uniform demography that did not represent a full cross-section of Cuban 
society, but they also shared the experiences of forced departure and a welcoming arrival 
in the United States. These individuals were inspired to leave Cuba for political, economic, 
and social reasons that arose from Castro’s reformist and repressive communist 
policies.261  
While the Cubans in this wave believed their exile would be temporary, the 1961 
Bay of Pigs invasion began to dim their prospects for returning to a democratic Cuba, and 
they had lost this hope altogether by the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the 
Kennedy–Khrushchev accord included a non-invasion clause.262 Moreover, during this 
time, Cubans were admitted to the United States as refugees by the thousands, given access 
to resettlement aid and a path to naturalization that was not offered to other Latin American 
immigrants. Of this cohort of Cuban exiles, approximately 89,053 were living in Miami by 
the end of 1965.263 
1. Government Response 
In addition to the bilateral politics between Cuba and the United States, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, that facilitated the Cuban diaspora’s arrival in the United States, 
the federal government complemented its foreign policy decision to welcome Cubans with 
tangible domestic support. In 1960, President Eisenhower responded to a plea for 
assistance from concerned civic society in Miami; this led to the creation of the Cuban 
Refugee Emergency Center, using funds from the anti-communism Mutual Security Act, 
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to assist in the resettlement of Cubans.264 While this program responded to domestic 
political concerns, it also furthered the U.S. foreign policy goal that motivated the 
admission of Cubans in the first place: undermining the Castro regime. From this program, 
in 1961, President Kennedy created the Cuban Refugee Program (CRP), which provided 
an array of assistance to Cubans who registered.265 By 1962, the CRP had been allotted 
about $70 million, and in addition to providing Cubans with aid, it also facilitated their 
resettlement across the United States; however, the majority remained in Miami by 
choice.266 This program continued the previous administration’s policy of welcoming and 
inviting the arrival of Cuban exiles while also expanding federal support for their transition. 
Federal assistance continued through the 1960s, as the United States provided 
Cuban exiles with numerous supportive programs from the national and local levels of 
government. The CRP provided Cubans with financial, medical, vocational, educational, 
job placement, and food aid.267 In addition, the CRP provided funding to the Miami-Dade 
County school district to facilitate its admission of thousands of Cuban children.268 
Moreover, the federal government provided grants for local community groups to help 
Cuban professionals transfer their skills and education into usable licenses and certificates 
for employment opportunities, which included the creation of programs for doctor and 
teacher recertification and assisted with placement into white-collar employment for 
former professors and lawyers.269 The CRP also undertook nation-wide resettlement 
initiatives that matched Cubans with jobs and moved them to those locations.270  By 1964, 
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as  Cubans showed reluctance to move out of Miami, the Johnson administration made the 
CRP’s assistance to individuals contingent upon resettlement.271  
2. Economic Conditions 
Cubans arrived in Miami before it became a center of international business. In 
1960, Miami was experiencing an economic recession and a six percent unemployment 
rate, with a population of approximately 935,000.272 At the time, Miami’s economy was 
largely based on domestic winter tourism, and the city was considered a retirement city.273  
Accordingly, major airlines based their maintenance operations and hubs into Latin 
America in Miami; approximately 20 percent of the city’s labor force was employed in the 
tourist service sector.274 The next largest sector was small manufacturing, which employed 
13 percent of the labor force and experienced slow growth.275 Moreover, Miami’s 
reputation as a “tourist playground” also attracted illicit money, and in the early 1960s, 
there was a widespread presence of mobsters in Miami Beach.276  While the city relied on 
its growing seasonal tourism, employment opportunities did not grow in tandem.277    
Moreover, while Miami’s elites had envisioned the city’s internationalization, it 
was not until a decade after the Cuban exiles arrived that Cuban entrepreneurs made Miami 
a center of international trade and banking.278 While some Cuban exiles had the means, 
after settling in, for entrepreneurial endeavors, the majority of them entered into the 
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existing labor force in tourism, in many cases displacing African-Americans.279 In the 
subsequent decades, the exile community—taking advantage of the transitional and 
occupational assistance provided by the CRP—would create an enclave economy that not 
only transformed Miami but also provided opportunities for economic advancement to 
subsequent Latin American immigrants. 
3. Societal Attitudes 
Given the challenging economic conditions in Miami and the robust government 
support provided to Cubans, societal attitudes toward Cubans were mixed: positive at the 
national level and supportive yet resentful at the local level. The national narrative about 
Cubans depicted them as pro-democracy, model immigrants. In his analysis of media 
publications, Cramer identifies a consistent depiction of Cubans as “good immigrants:” 
they were white, well-educated, hard-working, and anti-communist.280 These narratives 
tended to overlook variations in the exile community and lauded their purported monolithic 
positive attributes. While some of the inspiration for this message came from Cuban exiles’ 
own identity-creation, Cramer stresses that the information campaign stemmed from the 
CRP’s proactive public relations effort.281 Through depicting Cubans as desirable 
immigrants, worthy of assistance, the CRP was able to generate support for its resettlement 
programs, which required volunteer sponsors across the United States.282  
Conversely, at the local level, despite civil society’s mobilization to support 
Cubans, latent resentment and xenophobia arose. As early as 1961, the stresses created by 
the influx of Cubans in Miami were high enough to merit the first of two congressional 
hearings on “Cuban Refugee Problems” (the second was held a year later), in which 
community leaders and concerned citizens voiced their apprehensions about the size, 
resettlement and local treatment of Cubans in Miami and requested additional federal 
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aid.283 The testimony of participants in the reception process for Cubans indicated a desire 
to help the refugees, but the observable disparity between needy Americans and Cubans 
was clear to Miamians: Cubans received 10 to 20 percent more average monthly financial 
aid than American citizens on welfare; Cubans received surplus food aid and needy citizens 
did not; and while Cubans were offered job-training and resettlement opportunities for 
employment, locals were not afforded such assistance.284 As a result, Miamians expressed 
their frustration over losing jobs to Cubans who accepted lower wages and the burden of 
caring for refugees in their city, as evidenced in local newspapers.285 Additionally, 
Miamians assigned negative stereotypical behavior to Cubans in these outlets including 
complaints over their loud Spanish, disrespect for the law, and rude driving; locals even 
posted signs prohibiting the presence of Cubans in housing complexes.286  
Moreover, the African-American community in Miami also expressed opposition 
to Cuban exiles’ treatment. At a time when school integration of white and black students 
was underway, Afro-Cubans attended white schools that were still off-limits to blacks 
because, although a minority of the exiles were black, Cubans were treated as a monolithic 
block.287 This situation added another layer of resentment, in addition to the tensions of 
all Miamians, for the African-American community. Perhaps the best expression of the 
sentiment came from a minister quoted in the 1961 Senate hearing: “perhaps the American 
Negro could solve the school integration problem by teaching his children to speak 
Spanish.”288 The minister’s view represented a sentiment of indignation among black 
Miamians, who perceived that immigrants were receiving better treatment and services 
than American citizens.  
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4. Presence of Ethnic Communities 
This wave of Cubans created the ethnic enclave seen in Miami today, but at the 
time of their arrival, they relied upon other sources of support. Florida has long-standing 
Cuban communities dating back to the nineteenth century, but they are located hours away 
from Miami in Tampa and Key West.289 Nonetheless, by 1959, a generations-old 
community of approximately 30,000 Cubans resided in Miami, but at that time, African-
Americans made up the largest minority, followed by a sizeable Jewish minority.290 While 
these Cubans were likely assimilated into the mainstream Anglo culture, a small, urban 
community in the Little Havana section of Miami, which was only four percent “Latin” in 
1950, initially welcomed the Cuban exiles.291 However, by 1960, Little Havana was not a 
major reception area for the exiles because housing was not available, and over time, the 
exiles outgrew this area due to a combination of economic assimilation and zoning laws 
prohibiting increased population density in this area.292 With the subsequent flows of 
Cuban exiles, Little Havana became a nearly 100 percent Cuban community by 1974, 
indicating a trend of displacement and “white-flight” of non-Hispanic Whites that 
contributed to Miami’s overwhelmingly Hispanic population in subsequent decades.293 
5. Cubans: Conclusion 
By the time anticommunist fervor faded in the United States and the Cold War 
ended, Cubans were embedded in the United States and Miami. Unable to return to Cuba, 
they played a large role in turning Miami into a thriving city with an international economy. 
They established an upwardly mobile ethnic enclave that provided a network of support to 
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subsequent Cuban immigrants and even other Latin American immigrants. They became 
naturalized citizens at high rates and created a prominent Cuban-American political force, 
both as a voting block and in their creation of politicians.294  These accomplishments, 
which are surveyed in more detail in the next chapter, were made possible by the U.S. 
government’s proactive, multi-faceted support of Cuban exiles, which allowed the 
transferal of work experience and education into viable professions in the United States; 
prevented Cubans’ downward economic assimilation with an economic safety net; 
encouraged a positive national identity of the Cuban diaspora; and—despite resettlement 
efforts—facilitated the development of a vibrant ethnic enclave in Miami.  
B. SALVADORANS IN 1980s LOS ANGELES 
As evidenced in the previous chapter, Salvadorans were “pushed” out of their 
homeland as a result of protracted civil war in which the United States supported the right-
wing Salvadoran junta. Despite the restrictive U.S. immigration policy, which aligned with 
the administration’s support of the junta, Salvadorans were “pulled” to the United States 
by pre-existing economic ties, familiarity with the country, and social networks. While 
some 12,361 Salvadorans entered the United States on immigrant visas between 1979 and 
1981, the vast majority of Salvadorans entered or stayed illegally, and few believed they 
would stay permanently.295 Because neither asylum nor refugee entrance were feasible 
options for those who could not get an immigrant visa, unauthorized entry became their 
way to enter the United States. Thus, their journeys less often involved air travel and more 
often involved a combination of precarious travel modes through Guatemala and 
Mexico.296 Moreover, because the journey from El Salvador to the United States required 
access to material and social resources, the immigration patterns of the poorest Salvadorans 
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fleeing the civil war was either rural to urban migration or remained within Central 
America.297  
The experience of the Salvadorans who arrived between 1979 and 1982 has been 
less liminal than that of subsequent arrivals. In 1986, some undocumented Salvadorans 
benefitted from the Immigration Reform and Control Act’s (IRCA) amnesty clause—but 
only those 167,952 who arrived before January 1982—leaving an estimated 400,000 to 
600,000 Salvadorans vulnerable to deportation across the United States.298 However, prior 
to the normalization of this early cohort’s legal status, they were subjected to high and 
disproportionate rates of apprehension and removal from the United States.299 Moreover, 
the IRCA gave illegals one year to apply for legalization and another 18 months for 
permanent residency, after which citizenship would be an option; simultaneously, the 
IRCA penalized employers of illegal aliens.300 Thus, these conditions divided the 
experiences between cohorts in the Salvadoran exile community, where the 1979-1982 
unauthorized arrivals experienced less prolonged uncertainty over their legal status than 
later arrivals.   
Beginning in 1979, as Salvadorans fled the nascent civil war in their country of 
origin and travelled north into the United States, Los Angeles emerged as a major 
destination.301 Whereas in 1970 there were roughly 7,700 foreign-born Salvadorans living 
in Los Angeles, by 1980, this number had reached 61,600, and by 1990, there were 
301,567.302 Based on a RAND study of Los Angeles-based Salvadorans in 1991, of those 
early 1980s Salvadoran immigrants, approximately two thirds were amnestied by the IRCA 
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of 1986.303 Moreover, because the violence of El Salvador’s civil war affected all 
segments of society, the diaspora included the full spectrum of socioeconomic classes from 
El Salvador.304 In his survey of legal Central American immigrants in California in 1980, 
Wallace notes 24 percent of them had at least some college, and of those arriving between 
1975 and 1979, about 28 percent were professionals, 46 percent were blue-collar workers, 
and 24 percent worked in the service industry.305 Subsequent arrivals in the 1980s tended 
to be undocumented, as a result of the variety of U.S. policies that did not admit them as 
refugees or asylees, and about 30 percent had not finished high school; still, this cohort 
included middle-class workers and a small contingent of political activists fleeing 
repression who would later organize Salvadorans around the Sanctuary movement in Los 
Angeles.306 While Wallace’s sample is not representative of the entire Salvadoran 
immigrant flow, it supports the theoretical assumption that pioneer migrants tend to differ 
from subsequent migrants, and it weakens the notion that Salvadorans arrived as a 
homogenous block of unskilled, uneducated laborers. Moreover, like the Golden Exiles 
from Cuba, the first wave of Salvadorans was not representative of El Salvador’s 
demographics—it too, reflected a higher level of human capital—which is consistent not 
only within the grouping of legal Salvadoran immigrants but also of undocumented 
Salvadorans during this first period.307  
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1. Government Response  
Given the confluence of U.S. foreign policy consideration in the Salvadoran civil 
war, impacts of continued migration from Cuba and other Central American countries, and 
the 1980 Refugee Act’s redefinition of a refugee, as reviewed in the previous chapter, the 
government response to Salvadoran migration to the United States began as exclusion. 
Exclusion turned to passive acceptance because of the Salvadoran government’s pleas to 
maintain remittance flows, but also as a result of the grassroots efforts of civil society, 
Salvadorans, and the support of Congress. At the national level, President Reagan voiced 
concerns over Salvadoran migration and indicated a desire to prevent it; this coincided with 
the challenges of a massive inflow of Cubans during the Mariel crisis of 1980.308 In this 
context, the de facto U.S. stance was to deny refugee status and the asylum claims of 
Salvadorans, and to apply increased scrutiny to non-immigrant visas to prevent facilitating 
unauthorized migration.309  
Accordingly, unlike Cubans, Salvadorans were not provided transition support by 
the U.S. government, leaving a vacuum that was filled by religious and civic organizations 
throughout the 1980s. From this support, a grassroots movement to protect Salvadorans 
from deportation during the ongoing civil war in El Salvador emerged. While the IRCA of 
1986 afforded the first wave Salvadorans the opportunity for citizenship, its hiring 
restrictions clause simultaneously endangered the livelihoods of the majority of 
Salvadorans living in the United States at that time. Moreover, it was not a measure directed 
at Salvadorans in particular, but rather a broad-based restrictionist response to high rates 
of immigration that was aimed at dissuading future migrants by penalizing their 
prospective employers.   
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2. Economic Conditions 
In the early 1980s, when Salvadorans began to arrive in Los Angeles, they 
encountered a city in transition: economic restructuring and growth, as well as a 
segmenting labor market. As part of this change, heavy manufacturing jobs moved 
overseas, while growth in the technological sector created high-paying jobs in electronics 
and aerospace.310 Additionally, the garment and furniture industries, real estate and 
construction sectors, and a budding foreign trade market also emerged during this time.311 
During much of the 1980s, Los Angeles stood in stark contrast to the rest of the United 
States, experiencing growth during a time of economic recession. 
The restructuring in Los Angeles’ economy was met with a simultaneous surge in 
the city’s population, namely from Latin American and Asian immigrant groups, turning 
the collective population of minorities into the largest population in the city. 312  In his 
analysis of occupational change in Los Angeles during this time, Valenzuela finds that the 
city’s economy accommodated those new immigrants with employment in low-paying jobs 
previously held by whites, while whites shifted to white-collar, higher-pay occupations.313 
He notes that the city’s economic growth increased its employment rate but summarizes 
the growing disparity between whites, blacks, and Latinos by adding that “close to 70 
percent of the Latino labor force and 45 percent of the African-American labor force were 
employed in the lower-paid, non-white-collar occupations.”314  
For Salvadorans in particular, these local conditions, coupled with their lack of 
English and precarious legal status, translated into low-wage employment in janitorial, 
restaurant, and domestic services, construction, and manufacturing jobs.315 This pattern of 
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employment would later be sustained by continued Salvadoran migration to the city and 
the compounding effect of support networks that facilitate new immigrant’s job searches. 
Of note, Menjívar’s interviews with Salvadorans reflect a self-identification among these 
immigrants as “enterprising people” who just needed an opportunity to succeed, a fact she 
supports with the high rates of employment (over 81 percent) and low rates of public 
assistance (7.1 percent) among them.316 When this self-professed work ethic is combined 
with the substantial remittances Salvadorans sent to their home country ($1.3 billion a year 
in the 1980s),317 it indicates Salvadoran economic assimilation may have been limited by 
their family circumstances, or a long-term desire to return home, as compared to early 
Cubans in Miami who did not send remittances to Cuba soon after their arrival.  
3. Societal Attitudes 
Salvadorans began to arrive at a time when national acceptance of immigrants had 
been exhausted by the surge in worldwide immigration and post-communist refugee flows, 
leading to a negative societal reception. Locally, they encountered fervent supporters that 
would prove indispensable to their immigrant community, but at the neighborhood level, 
they experienced tensions with other minority groups. On the national level, surges in 
immigration and refugee flows since the 1960s had begun to influence American opinion 
in the direction of restrictionism.318 The results of a national Gallup Poll in 1984 indicated 
55 percent of Americans were opposed to the IRCA’s amnesty clause, and 75 percent 
supported penalties against employers of illegal aliens; these results were consistent with 
a similar poll in 1980.319 Moreover, leading up to the arrival of Salvadorans, nearly half 
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the population favored a decrease in immigration, and 79 percent opposed an increase in 
the level of immigration to the United States.320 
Nonetheless, many Americans—including established immigrants, religious 
organizations, union leaders, and progressives—were sympathetic toward the Salvadoran 
diaspora and in vehement disagreement with U.S. national and foreign policy toward them 
and their country of origin.321 In the early 1980s, this sentiment manifested in a grassroots 
initiative to provide the would-be refugees with transitional aid and services, including 
legal advice and information campaigns.322 This movement also inspired and empowered 
Salvadoran political activists within the diaspora community to take action for themselves, 
leading to the growth of numerous political organizations that served to create a sense of 
community and solidarity among Salvadorans and Central Americans.323 Over time, the 
support turned into a sanctuary movement that lobbied lawmakers for protection from 
deportation on behalf of Salvadorans.324 Although this movement gained supporters in 
Congress, including Senator Edward Kennedy, who advocated for Salvadorans as early as 
1981, they did not achieve legislative success until the 1990 approval of Temporary 
Protected Status for Salvadorans.325  
4. Presence of Ethnic Communities 
The early post-civil war Salvadoran immigrants to Los Angeles during this time 
did not benefit from the solidarity of an existing ethnic community. According to the 1980 
census, 84,757 people of self-reported Salvadoran descent lived in California.326 However, 
contrary to the experience of Salvadorans in San Francisco, where there was a long history 
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of migration, Los Angeles in the early 1980s was a new destination that would become the 
largest Salvadoran community outside the country, beginning with this cohort.327 By 1991, 
only roughly 26 percent of Salvadorans living in the city had been there for ten years or 
more.328 These Salvadorans generally settled into predominantly Spanish-speaking 
Mexican neighborhoods in Los Angeles’ inner city.329 While in some ways the similarity 
in language and culture between the two minorities facilitated Salvadorans’ transitions, the 
difficulty of living in poor urban areas proved inescapable for many.330 By the late 1980s, 
Salvadorans’ now ubiquitous association with gang culture had emerged, due in part to the 
threat posed by Mexican gangs toward Salvadorans, particularly male youths, in urban Los 
Angeles.331 Additionally, Salvadorans felt tensions with fellow residents based on 
perceived arrogance of Mexicans, established immigrants, and other immigrant groups, 
namely Koreans.332 Lastly, Salvadorans also faced resentment from African-Americans 
who accused them of taking their jobs, and in turn they blamed African-Americans for 
crime and drug problems in the neighborhoods.333  
Within the Salvadoran cohort, widespread ethnic solidarity was slow to materialize 
as a result of the legal, economic, and demographic differences between new and 
established immigrants. Given the reliance of new immigrants on their kin networks, the 
vast majority of Central Americans lived close to one another, inside the Los Angeles 
metropolitan area—a necessary but insufficient condition in the formation of a Salvadoran 
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ethnic community.334 While the 1979 to 1981 wave of Salvadorans responded to its 
sociopolitical challenges in the United States with political activism, disunity within the 
broader ethnic group stemmed from the national anti-immigrant rhetoric: pre-established 
Salvadorans wanted to dissociate from the negative image new arrivals propagated by 
virtue of being poor and persecuted.335  Also, at least initially, the negative governmental 
and economic reception of Salvadorans inhibited the development of social networks 
within the diaspora because they had little to share with one another.336 Adding to this 
segmentation within the community, the IRCA of 1986 made it more difficult for the vast 
majority of Salvadorans to obtain employment and limited them to low-wage and informal 
sectors while it afforded earlier arrivals an opportunity for integration.337 As a 
consequence of this policy and the pre-existing economic divergence between established 
Salvadorans and new arrivals, the formation of pan-Salvadoran ethnic solidarity was slow 
to materialize.  
5. Salvadorans: Conclusion 
The juxtaposition of national anti-immigration policies and attitudes with the local 
economic opportunity and activism of sympathetic civil groups marked the early 
experiences of the early post-Salvadoran civil war exiles in the United States. The U.S. 
government classification of them as either economic migrants or refugees fleeing 
persecution made a profound impact on their reception context. Unwilling to return to El 
Salvador’s civil war or the economic conditions in its wake, Salvadorans settled into their 
community in Los Angeles. They demonstrated the potential agency of immigrant groups 
in their ability to organize and provide services to their own community but also struggled 
to develop a thriving ethnic enclave because of the segmentation of their diaspora along 
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legal and economic statuses. Their difficulties and successes in assimilation originated in 
these macro-structural conditions that initially confined them to the lower ends of the 
socioeconomic ladder; thus, Salvadorans have faced an uphill battle to achieve successful 
integration in the United States.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The context of reception plays a paramount role in the assimilation of immigrants, 
and has a cascading effect from earlier cohorts of a particular immigrant group to the later 
arrivals. This context is shaped—whether positive or negative—in large part by U.S. 
foreign policy concerns and the resulting immigration policies toward particular groups: 
foreign policy influences the immigration status of groups which then has decisive impacts 
on the group’s ability to integrate economically, the identity ascribed to them at the national 
and local levels, and the trajectory of their ethnic community. As explained by Portes and 
Rumbaut, “the fate of these later arrivals depends, to a large extent, on the kinds of 
community created by their conationals and the access to the resources that this community 
posses.”338 To facilitate the characterization of the two reception contexts described in this 
chapter, Table 1 summarizes the experiences of the first-wave of Cuban and Salvadoran 
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Table 1.   Context of Reception for Cubans Arriving in Miami 1959–1965 
and Salvadorans arriving in Los Angeles 1979–1982.339 



















































In the case of Cubans, the welcoming reception context of refugee status and 
assistance programs helped them to transfer their existing personal assets into employment 
in all sectors of Miami’s economy, gain access to education, and shaped a positive exile 
identity, which over time yielded a thriving ethnic community. This Cuban community 
proved instrumental to the integration of later Cuban refugees, providing them with the 
benefits of an ethnic enclave that was embedded in the primary economy of Miami. 
Because Salvadorans shared commonalities with refugees, but lacked the commensurate 
legal status, they experienced an opposing, negative reception context. Their personal 
resource endowments (while admittedly less upper-class than Cubans), were not easily 
transferrable. Their illegal status constrained them to low-wage jobs in Los Angeles, 
ascribed a negative collective identity to them—which led established Salvadorans to 
disassociate themselves from the new arrivals. The reception context also generated an 
ethnic community, divided by cohorts of legality, with few resources to share other than 
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political mobilization; these factors all contributed significantly to the Salvadoran ethnic 
community’s notorious ties to gang culture and poverty which perpetuated a negative 
reception for later Salvadoran immigrants. The following chapter will discuss the long-
term effects of these environments on the second-generation of both the Cuban and 
Salvadoran exiles as seen in their assimilation characteristics. 
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IV. SECOND-GENERATION STRUCTURAL ASSIMILATION 
As shown in previous chapters, U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba and El Salvador 
significantly influenced U.S. immigration policy toward those countries and contributed to 
positive and negative aspects of each respective exile group’s reception context. This 
chapter now shows the impact of the structural conditions these immigrant parents faced 
on the structural assimilation of their children in the United States. An examination of the 
Cuban and Salvadoran exile communities’ second generation—children of immigrants 
born in the United States—demonstrates that both groups educationally outperformed their 
local contexts, but that Salvadoran-Americans’ employment and remuneration lags behind 
Cuban-Americans.’340 In essence, with this small, but important, differentiation as to what 
degree, both adult second-generation of the 1959–1965 wave of Cubans immigrants and 
the 1979–1982 wave of Salvadorans both demonstrate structural assimilation into 
American society after roughly 25 years in the United States.  
While the Cuban second generation’s upward assimilation is consistent with the 
conditions of a positive reception context, the Salvadoran second generation’s partial 
upward assimilation appears contrary to the negative reception context. Given that the 
amnesty law in 1986 turned Salvadorans’ reception context to passively accepting, this 
may indicate the primacy of legal status above other factors in the reception context with 
respect to structural assimilation outcomes. 
A. METHODOLOGY AND DATA  
It is well established in the literature that initial integration experiences affect long-
term adaptation patterns of subsequent generations. In their study of immigrant groups 
across the United States, Portes and Rumbaut found a “durable influence of the first 
immigrant generation on the successful adaptation of children,” and given immigrants’ 
particular contexts of reception, nationalities “exercise a strong influence on [the second 
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generation’s] educational attainment.”341 Moreover, Portes and Rumbaut determine that 
the adaptation process is cumulative: positive contexts, high socioeconomic status, and 
social capital lead to positive outcomes, whereas negative contexts, low socioeconomic 
status, and social capital increase the likelihood of negative outcomes.342 Nonetheless, 
reception contexts and human capital interact to determine the course of immigrants’ and 
their children’s long-term assimilation or ethnic resilience in the face of the dominant 
culture and social mainstream in the United States.343 Neither factor is unilaterally 
predictive of assimilation outcomes, but because of the similarity between the two cohorts 
studied here, the structural assimilation outcomes can be attributed to the reception context: 
government responses, economic conditions, societal attitudes, and the presence of ethnic 
communities.  
The adaptation process is overwhelmingly studied in terms of acculturation (losing 
the old culture) and assimilation (adopting a new culture) using structural indicators to 
show that immigrants adapt in non-linear and varying ways across groups.344 Because the 
notion of a single American culture is a relic of times past, immigrants’ children can 
assimilate into any of various segments of American society when they reach adulthood. 
This differential assimilation can include upward assimilation into the middle-class and 
higher or downward assimilation into a lower-end socioeconomic position. Second-
generation children who demonstrate selective acculturation combine aspects of adaptation 
to American norms with the retention of their immigrant parents’ cultural traditions, 
including their language.345 This hybrid adaptation may prevent downward assimilation 
in some immigrant groups by delaying cultural assimilation until, for instance, their parents 
achieve structural assimilation.346 Conversely, children of immigrants may also 
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experience dissonant acculturation: they abandon their parent’s culture and adopt 
American norms, but their parents retain the immigrant culture.347 In this case, the cultural 
cleavage within a family puts the children at-risk of downward assimilation, depending on 
the contextual factors—particularly the family’s socioeconomic status.348 
To determine which assimilation patterns the adult children of Cuban and 
Salvadoran immigrants demonstrate, this research adopts a combination of socioeconomic 
measures used widely by prolific social scientists.349 These measures include male 
incarceration rates and female early childbearing, educational attainment, and labor 
market achievement. Male incarceration is linked to limited occupational opportunities for 
men, and female early childbearing is negatively associated with educational attainment 
for women; as such, this information provides insights into the second generations’ 
educational and occupational achievement.350 Educational attainment is a fairly standard 
metric for socioeconomic integration and is discussed in terms of high school incompletion, 
at least some college attendance, and completion of a bachelor’s degree or higher. Labor 
market achievement is discussed in terms of occupational distributions, income related to 
educational and occupational attainment, and poverty levels as defined in the U.S. Census 
Bureau.351 These metrics are presented in comparison on the national level to other 
Hispanic groups and on the local level to non-Hispanics; in some cases, as available, 
separate data is presented for male and female achievement. 
Whenever possible, the data presented in this chapter includes information 
reasonably associated with the initial waves of Cuban and Salvadoran immigrants. To 
achieve this, in line with the U.S. census age categories and Ruben and Rumbaut’s 
definitions of the adult second generation as ages 25 to 39, the information presented covers 
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Cuban-Americans born no earlier than 1959 and Salvadoran-Americans born no earlier 
than 1979. Accordingly, Table 2 demonstrates the earliest year in which these groups reach 
and surpass this definition of adulthood. Additionally, as of 2013, only approximately 30 
percent of the Salvadoran second-generation in the United States were older than eighteen. 
352 In comparison, as of 2016, approximately 74 percent of the Cuban second generation 
in the United States were over eighteen.353 Thus, comparisons between these two groups 
will at times come from U.S. census data from different years to capture this age cohort 
difference. 
Table 2.   Approximate Range of Second-Generations Entering Adulthood. 




of First Cuban 
Exiles 
1959–1965 1984–1990 1998–2004 
Second-Generation 
of First Salvadoran 
Exiles 
1979–1982 2004–2007 2018–2021 
 
The results presented here stem primarily from secondary sources: 1) Portes and 
Rumbaut’s analysis of longitudinal data on the second generation; and 2) Bergad and 
Klein’s intra-Hispanic data on assimilation factors from 1980 to 2005. These sources are 
supplemented by local data in the American Community Surveys for Los Angeles County 
and Miami-Dade County, both areas as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. Based on the 
latter source, Table 3 indicates each ethnic community’s total population size, the size of 
the naturalized first generation, the size of the second generation, and the total number of 
adults from 25 to 39 years of age. 
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Table 3.   United States Census Bureau Estimates of Cuban and Salvadoran 
Population Size, Nativity, and Ages in 2000 and 2010. 354 
 
While the ability to sort the data categories to include only second-generation 
Cuban-Americans and Salvadoran-Americans within particular time frames would 
undoubtedly provide relevant insights, this research is limited by the difficulty of 
disaggregating the available statistics. As a result, some of the information presented will 
include immigrants’ and subsequent generations’ data. Nonetheless, these figures provide 
powerful insights into each group’s adaptation—they assimilate structurally over time and 
particularly for Salvadorans, this occurs in spite of policy constraints. While it would be 
useful to uncover nuances in adaptation between arrival cohorts, the cumulative character 
of the adaptation process suggests that the shared experience of a particular ethnic 
community is likely to perpetuate for later immigrants.355  
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B. THE CHILDREN OF THE GOLDEN CUBAN EXILES356 
The children of the first post-Castro Cuban exiles in the United States have fared 
well compared to both white, native-born Americans and other Hispanic immigrants. In 
Miami, they enjoyed the benefits of bilingual—and for many—private schooling, in an 
environment where they were sheltered from discrimination and exposure to the challenges 
of the lower socioeconomic strata of Miami’s society.357 These benefits were accorded to 
them by their parents, the Cuban exiles, for whom the positive context of reception 
facilitated their integration into Miami, where they employed their personal talents and 
capital to create a thriving ethnic enclave that preserved Cuban culture and displaced non-
Hispanic whites as the power center of the city. First-generation Cuban-Americans became 
mayors, large-scale entrepreneurs, small-business owners, and the clear demographic and 
cultural majority in many part of Miami-Dade County.358 
As early as 1990, when the second generation of the Golden Cuban Exiles were 
entering adulthood, their measures of educational attainment exceeded the local averages 
and set them up for the upward socioeconomic movement seen in their occupational 
statuses. While the achievements of the broader Cuban enclave in Miami are part of the 
story, the discussion of Cuban achievements below belongs to a small subset of the Cuban 
exile community: by 1990, only four percent of Cuban adults were U.S.-born; this 
increased to seven percent in 2000, and 12 percent in 2005.359 This particular second-
generation put their human and social capital endowments to use and avoided the pitfalls 
of downward assimilation, in part by retaining a strong sense of Cuban identity—the 
Spanish language, Cuban nationalism, social customs, and above all pride in the exiles’ 
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cubanidad (Cubanness)—while gradually adopting a more American way of life than 
their parents.360  
1. Male Incarceration Rates and Female Early Childbearing  
Inasmuch as incarceration rates and early childbearing have a negative effect on 
educational attainment and income, they can be important indicators of immigrant 
adaptation. While U.S.-born Cuban-Americans’ incarceration rates are higher than White 
Americans’, early childbearing rates are below white and Black Americans averages. 
According to the 2000 U.S. census, the incarceration rate of U.S.-born Cubans between 25 
and 39 years of age was 4.20 percent.361 While these figures are above the incarceration 
rates of white Americans (1.71 percent), and the U.S. child of immigrant average (3.5 
percent), they are well below the 11.61% rate for Black Americans.362 Among U.S.-born 
Cuban women, 1.8 percent of those aged 15 to 19 and 11.4 percent of women 20 to 24 had 
at least one child by the year 2000.363 These rates are slightly lower than the White 
American rate of 1.9 percent for women 15 to 19 years old and 15.6 percent for women 20 
to 24 years old.364 These rates are also much lower than Black Americans’ rates of 4.5 
percent and 22.5 percent, respectively. Given these comparatively low rates among the 
Cuban second-generation, neither incarceration nor early childbearing appear to have 
significantly hindered this Cuban cohort’s educational attainment. 
2. Educational Attainment 
As the earliest of the second-generation Cuban-Americans entered adulthood, they 
demonstrated a pattern of increased educational attainment over time and achieved well 
above the local average for Miami. Of U.S.-born Cubans over 25 years old, in 1990, 18 
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percent had not completed high school a figure that had dropped to 14 percent by 2000.365 
Moreover, in 1990, 59 percent of adult U.S.-born Cubans had completed at least some 
college, and by 2000, this number had increased to 67 percent.366 Also in 1990, 26 percent 
of domestic-born Cubans had earned a bachelor’s degree or higher; by 2000, this rate had 
increased to 34 percent.367 By comparison, the 2000 Census for Miami-Dade County 
reported a total high school incompletion rate of 32.1 percent for adults 25 and over, and 
45.5 percent who completed at least some college.368 Table 4 summarizes this stark 
contrast between the educational attainment of U.S.-born Cubans (who were mostly 
concentrated in Miami) and the Miami-Dade County average. 
Table 4.   Comparison between U.S.-Born Cuban Educational Attainment 
and Miami-Dade County Average in 2000.369 
Educational Attainment 





High School Incomplete 14% 32.1% 
Some College or Higher 67% 45.5% 
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher 34% 21.7% 
 
While the data presented shows a pattern of high educational attainment among the 
early second-generation Cuban-Americans, it is a pattern that continues among later 
arrivals as well. The cross-generational comparisons of Bergad and Klein indicate that, 
while the arrival of later Cubans slowed the total percentage of educational achievement 
among Cubans (in 2005, the high school incompletion rate was 8 percent for domestic-
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born Cubans versus 30 percent for the foreign-born), both domestic and foreign-born 
Cubans demonstrated continued increases in educational achievement from 1980 to 
2005.370 Bergad and Klein’s evidence of continued high educational attainment among 
Cubans supports the cumulative characterization of ethnic communities’ adaptation 
patterns, as shaped by the interaction between their human capital endowment and 
reception context.371 
3. Labor Market Achievement 
Reflecting their high educational attainment, U.S.-born Cuban-Americans average 
slightly higher rates of white-collar employment than other groups, with some variance 
between male and female rates. In 2005, domestic-born Cuban men over 16 years of age 
were employed in the following sectors: 33.6 percent management, professional, and 
related occupations; 17.7 percent service occupations; 24.9 percent sales and office 
occupations; 0.4 percent in farming, fishing, and forestry; 12.6 percent construction, 
extraction, and maintenance; and 10.5 percent production, transportation, and material 
moving.372 The occupations of domestic-born Cuban women were 38.7 percent 
management, professional, and related occupations; 16.4% service occupations; 41.6% 
sales and office occupations; 0.2 percent in farming, fishing, and forestry; 0.8 percent 
construction, extraction, and maintenance; and 2.3 percent production, transportation, and 
material moving.373 Second-generation Cubans were employed in the upper-echelon 
occupations at slightly higher rates than their non-Hispanic white counterparts. Moreover, 
fewer Cuban women than white women were employed in the lower-end occupations, but 
more Cuban men were employed in the service sector than white men. Table 5 summarizes 
the comparisons between the total populations, as discussed above. 
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Table 5.   Comparison between U.S.-born Cubans and Non-Hispanic White 
Occupational Representation.374 
Occupational Category Total Population Ages ≥16 in 2005 U.S.-Born Cuban Non-Hispanic White 
Management and Professionals  36.2% 35.4% 
Sales and Office  33.3% 27.4% 
Service 17.1% 14.9% 
Construction, Extraction, and Maintenance  6.6% 9.6% 
 
Despite their higher-status occupations, this same grouping of the Cuban second-
generation earned less median income than non-Hispanic whites, with the exception of 
Cuban professional women, who earned more than their Anglo counterparts. Domestic-
born Cuban-American men earned an upper-end median income of $52,971 for managerial 
and professional employment and a lower-end median income of $18,540 for service 
occupations.375 In comparison, non-Hispanic white men earned $8,149 more as managers 
and professionals, and $1,935 more in the service sector.376 Native-born Cuban-American 
women earned $40,747 and $9,983 in those same occupations, respectively, with non-
Hispanic white women earning $4,686 less than professional Cuban women and $407 more 
than those in service occupations.377  
In terms of socioeconomic opportunity and poverty, Cuban-Americans also fare 
well. By 2005, Cubans were the most highly remunerated Hispanic immigrant group as 
compared to educational attainment: Cubans with a four-year college degree or better 
earned an average income of $60,482; the next-best group was Puerto Ricans, earning 
$8,532 less for the same level of education.378 Turning to poverty levels in 1990, the rate 
was 11.3 percent among Cubans 15-44 years of age.379 This rate was the lowest among 
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Hispanic nationalities, with the highest rate being 28.4 percent among Dominicans.380 
However, this rate was almost three percentage points higher than the non-Hispanic white 
poverty rate for the same age group, which was 8.6 percent.381 Given the inclusion of first-
generation Cubans in the poverty calculations, it is possible and reasonable to assume that 
this metric would be lower if it were specific to the second generation.  
4. Conclusion on the Second-Generation Cubans 
U.S.-born Cubans perform highly on all measures of structural assimilation, 
particularly in their local context of Miami. Given the local environment in which this 
cohort of Cuban-Americans was raised, their outcomes lend support to the concept of 
selective acculturation—Cuban immigrant parents, improved the economic context of 
Miami with their economic assimilation but did not acculturate. Instead, they turned Miami 
into a vibrant ethnic enclave, which their children have since used as springboards in their 
own socioeconomic paths. 
Ultimately, this cohort of Cubans demonstrates high educational attainment and 
socioeconomic integration into the middle-class and higher. As compared to other Hispanic 
groups and non-Hispanic whites, they tend to be employed in white-collar professions, but 
earn less than non-Hispanic whites in the same sector. The notable exception to this is 
among the white-collar second-generation Cuban women, who earned more than white 
women. This information supports the notion that Cubans have fared well in the United 
States, and that they have done so at rates higher than other Hispanic immigrant groups. 
C. THE CHILDREN OF THE WOULD-BE SALVADORAN REFUGEES  
The majority of the second-generation Salvadorans, whose parents arrived before 
1982, have achieved socioeconomic assimilation in the United States. Despite their 
parent’s challenging reception contexts—unauthorized entry, negative public perceptions, 
underemployment, lack of financial assistance—many young Salvadoran-Americans have 
earned college degrees and entered the middle-class and beyond. The statistics below, 
                                                 
380 Ibid. 
381 Ibid., loc. 3020. 
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while not the most impressive of second-generation immigrants, Hispanic or otherwise, 
demonstrate Salvadoran-Americans are not a poor, uneducated mass. In fact, they achieved 
this at a time when the major concentration of Salvadorans (those arriving in the 1980s) 
lived in the inner city and East Los Angeles, where 1990s gang and drug activity were 
intertwined parts of their environmental upbringing.382 
That said, while over time Salvadoran immigrants established a robust civil society 
full of social, political, and religious organizations in Los Angeles, they did not foster a 
strong sense of Salvadoran identity in the community.383 Instead Salvadoran youths, due 
to the preponderance of Mexicans in the city and their parent’s reluctance to revisit their 
difficult pasts in El Salvador, identified with a Latino identity.384 In comparison to second-
generation Cuban’s strong sense of identity, second-generation Salvadorans may not have 
had the sheltering effect of ethnic pride and identity. What they did have was a first 
generation which was largely hard working, and who invested time and resources into 
obtaining legal status for themselves (and in effect keeping the family intact), and 
improving their working and living conditions incrementally.385 Accordingly, the 
Salvadoran ethnic community in Los Angeles was slow to materialize, but undoubtedly 
benefited from the upward socioeconomic mobility of some of their second-generation 
members.386 
On a methodological note, because Salvadorans arrived in the United States en 
masse twenty years after Cubans, their second generation is younger. Thus, the data in this 
section begins in the year 2000; in some discussions, same-year comparisons with Cubans 
are provided with the caveat that time is essential to adaptation, and later dates of arrival 
and birth are clearly constraints on educational and occupational achievement.  
                                                 
382 Nora Hamilton and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, Seeking Community in a Global City: Guatemalans 
and Salvadorans in Los Angeles (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 42, &153. 
383 Hamilton and Chinchilla, Seeking Community in a Global City, 46. 
384 Ibid., 56. 
385 Ibid., 178 
386 Ibid., 188. 
 85 
1. Male Incarceration Rates and Female Early Childbearing  
Inasmuch as incarceration rates and early childbearing have a negative effect on 
educational attainment and income earnings, U.S. Salvadoran rates are somewhat above 
white Americans but well below the highest rates. According to the 2000 U.S. census, the 
incarceration rate of U.S.-born Salvadorans between 25 and 39 years of age was 3.04 
percent.387 While these figures are above the incarceration rates of white Americans (1.71 
percent), they are well below the 11.61 percent rate for Black Americans.388 Three percent 
of U.S.-born Salvadoran women ages 15 to 19 and 16.5 percent of U.S.-born Salvadoran 
women 20 to 24 had at least one child by the year 2000.389 These rates are slightly higher 
than the White American rate of 1.9 percent for women 15 to 19 and 15.6 percent for 
women 20 to 24.390 Conversely, these rates are much lower than Black Americans’ rates 
of 4.5 percent and 22.5 percent, respectively. These rates do not appear to have significantly 
hindered this Salvadoran cohort’s educational attainment. 
2. Educational Attainment 
Second-generation Salvadorans attained better-than-average educational levels 
than the average of their enclave city, Los Angeles. Among Salvadoran adults over 25 and 
born in the United States, 28 percent had not completed high school in the year 2000, and 
18 percent in the year 2005.391 Of this same cohort, 53 percent completed at least some 
college by 2000, which increased to 64 percent by 2005.392 By comparison, the census for 
Los Angeles County in 2005 reported a total high school incompletion rate of 25.6 percent 
                                                 
387 Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America, 289. Many sources combine statistics for Central 
Americans, this source did not disaggregate Salvadoran and Guatemalan incarcerations rates.  
388 Ibid. 
389 Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America, 289. Many sources combine statistics for Central 
Americans, this source did not disaggregate Salvadoran and Guatemalan female fertility rates. 
390 Ibid. 
391 Bergad and Klein, Hispanics in the United States, loc. 3540. 
392 Ibid. 
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for adults 25 and over, while 52.5 percent completed at least some college.393 Moreover, 
by 2005, 27 percent of these Salvadoran-Americans had completed a bachelor’s degree or 
higher, compared to 18.1 percent of Los Angeles County. Second-generation Salvadorans 
also outperformed second-generation Mexicans in both 2000 and 2005, when 39 and 45 
percent of Mexicans had at least some college, and only 11 and 15 percent had completed 
a bachelor’s degree or higher.394 Table 6 depicts the difference between the U.S.-born 
Salvadorans’ educational attainment rate (who were mostly concentrated in Los Angeles 
County) and the Los Angeles County averages. The cross-generational comparisons of 
Bergad and Klein indicate that, while the arrival of later Salvadoran immigrants slowed the 
total percentage of educational achievement among Salvadorans (in 2005, the high school 
incompletion rate was 18 percent for domestic-born Salvadorans versus 55 percent for the 
foreign-born), both domestic and foreign-born Salvadorans demonstrated continued 
increases in educational achievement from 2000 to 2005.395 
Table 6.   Comparison between U.S.-Born Salvadoran Educational 
Attainment and Los Angeles County Average in 2005.396 
Educational Attainment 
Total Population Ages ≥25 in 2005 
U.S.-Born Salvadoran 
(National) 
Los Angeles County 
Average 
High School Incomplete 18% 25.6% 
At Least Some College  64% 52.5% 
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher 27% 18.1% 
 
 
                                                 
393 United States Census Bureau, “Educational Attainment and Employment Status By Language 
Spoken at Home for the Population 25 Years and Over,” 2005 American Community Survey, Los Angeles 
County, California, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml. 
394 Bergad and Klein, Hispanics in the United States, loc. 3540 
395 Ibid., loc. 3541. 
396 Adapted from Bergad and Klein, Hispanics in the United States, loc. 3540 and United States 
Census Bureau, “Educational Attainment and Employment Status By Language Spoken at Home for the 
Population 25 Years and Over,” 2005 American Community Survey, Los Angeles County, California, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml. 
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Similar to the early Cuban second-generation, the disparity between the domestic 
and foreign-born Salvadoran-Americans is reflected in the high school incompletion 
statistics for 2005: 18 percent for the domestic-born and 55 percent for the foreign-born.397 
This indicates that commonly seen aggregate figures likely distort the educational 
attainment of native-born Salvadoran-Americans by skewing them downward.  
3. Labor Market Achievement 
Despite the similarities in educational achievement among this cohort to U.S.-born 
Cuban-Americans, occupational distributions in 2005 demonstrate that U.S.-born 
Salvadoran-Americans lag behind both Cubans and non-Hispanic whites in high-end 
occupations but outpace the employment rates of both in lower-paid office jobs. In 2005, 
the occupations of domestic-born Salvadoran men over 16 years of age included 
18.4 percent management, professional, and related occupations; 24.8 percent service 
occupations; 23.9 percent  sales and office occupations; 0.8 percent in farming, fishing, 
and forestry; 13.2 percent construction, extraction, and maintenance; and 18.6 percent 
production, transportation, and material moving.398 The occupational distribution of 
domestic-born Salvadoran women included 23.3 percent management, professional, and 
related occupations; 23.6 percent service occupations; 47.7 percent sales and office 
occupations; and 5.4% production, transportation, and material moving.399 Table 7 
summarizes this distribution of occupations in a total population comparison between 
native-born Salvadorans and non-Hispanic whites. The results may reflect the youth of 
Salvadoran adults, who may not have had the time to complete their professional schooling 
by 2005 or who have not yet advanced to managerial positions. 
 
                                                 
397 Bergad and Klein, Hispanics in the United States, loc. 3540. 
398 Bergad and Klein, Hispanics in the United States, loc. 4350. 
399 Ibid., loc. 4351. 
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Table 7.   Comparison between U.S.-born Salvadorans and Non-Hispanic 
White Occupational Representation.400 
Occupational Category 





Management and Professionals  20.9% 35.4% 
Sales and Office  35.8% 27.4% 
Service  24.2% 14.9% 
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry 0.4% 0.6% 
Construction, Extraction, and 
Maintenance  4.25% 9.6% 
 
In measures of socioeconomic opportunity, Salvadorans show greater differences 
with Cubans and non-Hispanic white Americans. In 2005, a Salvadoran with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher earned an average income of $40,851, nearly $20,000 less than their 
Cuban counterparts; in fact, out of the nine Hispanic nationalities measured by Bergad and 
Klein, Salvadorans ranked eighth, with Hondurans earning $5,570 less.401 In an interesting 
comparison, Salvadorans ranked second for remuneration among those who did not 
complete high school, earning $17,030 as compared to Cubans, who earned $14,246 for 
the same work.402  Shifting to poverty rates, in 2005, 15.2 percent of Salvadoran 15-44 
year-olds lived in poverty, as compared to 24.1 percent among Dominicans on the high end 
and 10.1 percent among Peruvians at the low end.403 Young Salvadoran adults’ poverty 
rate was higher than non-Hispanic whites, who had a 9.4 percent poverty rates among the 
same age group.404 Here again, the inability to disaggregate inter-generational data may 
be a factor in the higher than White American poverty rate.  
                                                 
400 Adapted from Bergad and Klein, Hispanics in the United States, loc. 4301 and 4350. 
401 Bergad and Klein, Hispanics in the United States, loc. 3548.; The other Hispanic groups studied 
were Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Colombians, Ecuadorians, Hondurans, and Peruvians. Within these groups, 
Hondurans make better comparisons for Salvadorans than South Americans, given the differential levels of 
unauthorized migration from these regions, which drastically alter their reception contexts. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Ibid., loc. 3051. 
404 Ibid., loc. 3020. 
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4. Conclusion on Salvadorans 
Surprisingly, this cohort of second-generation Salvadorans achieved better 
socioeconomic integration than is expected when looking across all Salvadoran immigrant 
statistics and the challenging Los Angeles environment of their youths. Nonetheless, this 
cohort of Salvadorans achieved rates of educational attainment beyond their local peers. 
Notably, the Los Angeles rates are likely lowered by the prevalence of Mexican-Americans 
who tend to have lower educational attainment. Additionally, despite their contextually 
above-average educational levels, Salvadorans are not well represented in white-collar 
occupations.  
In fact, when they do enter this occupational level, they are not as well compensated 
as their Hispanic and non-Hispanic white peers. College-educated Salvadorans under-earn 
non-Hispanic White Americans and most other Hispanic groups with college degrees, but 
Salvadoran high school drop-outs earn more than most other Hispanics without a high 
school diploma. This comparison may be indicative of discriminatory practices against 
Salvadoran-Americans in white-collar employment and/or a product of the Los Angeles 
economy, in which Salvadorans have historically been over represented in low wage, labor-
intensive jobs.405  
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Throughout their first 25 years of living in the United States, the initial waves of 
both Cuban and Salvadoran immigrants established ethnic communities in which their 
children were raised. For these Cubans, their dominance and stability in Miami created a 
second-generation with a strong sense of Cuban-American identity, high educational 
attainment, and employment opportunities that generally prepared them for upward 
socioeconomic assimilation. For these Salvadorans, the slow onset of community and 
Hispanic identity in Los Angeles did not significantly detract from their educational 
attainment, but failed to create high wage employment opportunities, which perhaps 
diminished the degree of their somewhat upward socioeconomic assimilation. For ease of 
                                                 
405 Hamilton and Chinchilla, Seeking Community in a Global City, 76–77. 
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comparison between the two cohorts, Table 8 lists their respective representation in 
adaptation metrics. 
Table 8.   Side-by-Side Comparison of Select Adaptation Metrics as 
Percentages of Total Population in Respective Age Groupings| 
and Years.406 
 
Using Portes and Rumbaut’s description of the adaptation process, this cohort of 
Cubans enjoyed the benefits of positive contexts, high and middle socioeconomic status, 
and abundant social capital as compared to the Salvadoran cohort which experienced 
negative, and later passively accepting contexts, low and middle socioeconomic status, and 
moderate social capital. Accordingly, Cuban-Americans consistently rank above other 
                                                 
406 Adapted from: Laird W. Bergad and Herbert S. Klein, Hispanics in the United States: A 
Demographic, Social, and Economic History, 1980–2005 (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 




Male Incarceration Rate Ages 25-39 in 
2000 4.2% 3.04% 
Female Early Childbearing Rate Ages 
15-19 in 2000 1.8% 3% 
Female Early Childbearing Rate Ages 
20-24 in 2000 11.4% 16.5% 
High School Incomplete Ages ≥ 25 in 
2000/2005 14% 18% 
At Least Some College Ages ≥ 25 in 
2000/2005 67% 64% 
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher ≥ 25 in 
2000/2005 34% 27% 
Management and Professionals Ages ≥16 
in 2005 36.2% 20.9% 
Sales and Office Occupations Ages ≥16 
in 2005 33.3% 35.8% 
Service Occupations Ages ≥16 in 2005 17.1% 24.2% 
Construction, Extraction, and 




Hispanic groups and near non-Hispanic White Americans in the structural measures 
discussed above, demonstrated a positive structural assimilation outcome. On the other 
hand, the Salvadoran cohort, while not as high achieving as Cubans, performs higher than 
local average on educational attainment and their labor statistics demonstrate some upward 
occupational mobility with a positive, but partial structural assimilation outcome. 
While the results for Salvadorans may appear to negate the effects of the reception 
context, it is important to note that the cohort’s legal status—an important element of the 
reception context—was less liminal than that of subsequent arrivals. The Salvadoran first 
generation was able to apply for legalization as early as 1986, meaning their second 
generation did not face the destabilizing uncertainty of their family’s situation for the 
majority of their upbringing. It is possible that while the context of reception for these 
Salvadoran immigrants was negative at the time of their arrival, as it turned to passive 
acceptance with the 1986 amnesty, where previously there were constraints, their shift in 
legal status created opportunities for their children’s educational advancement. Legal status 
may therefore have an overpowering effect on structural assimilation over other aspects of 
the reception context. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
American society expects immigrants to assimilate, yet contemporary views 
question whether Latin American immigrants are choosing to conform to this standard. 
However, this perspective does not account for the structural constraints placed upon 
immigrants through the influence of U.S. foreign and immigration policy. During the Cold 
War, two cases—Cuba in the 1960s and El Salvador in the 1980s—demonstrated 
differential U.S. policy responses and sustained, large-scale exile migrations to the United 
States, particularly to Miami and Los Angeles. In these cases, the U.S. response was to 
welcome and provide a positive reception to Cubans in Miami, while Salvadorans were 
excluded and constrained to the negative reception accorded to them as illegal migrants in 
Los Angeles—both responses stemming from U.S. foreign policy interests in Latin 
America. In light of this discrepancy, this thesis has asked the following question: How has 
the United States’ Cold War–era foreign and immigration policy affected the assimilation 
of Cuban and Salvadoran populations in the U.S.?  
In response to this question, this research put forth the following hypothesis: U.S. 
foreign and immigration policies shape the constraints within the context of reception of 
the first generation and have corresponding directional implications for the structural 
assimilation patterns of second-generation adult immigrants; Cubans would therefore 
demonstrate upward structural assimilation, while Salvadorans would demonstrate 
downward structural assimilation. This hypothesis was partially supported by the evidence 
presented in the previous chapters: First, foreign and immigration policy did contribute to 
the structural assimilation patterns of both the Cuban and Salvadoran cases through the 
reception contexts detailed in chapter three. However, because both cases’ second 
generations appear to be assimilating, the directionality of their assimilation did not diverge 
as expected.  
Given that these receptions were influenced in multiple dimensions by immigration 
policy and Cold War foreign policy concerns, these policies affected the rate of 
assimilation of the ethnic populations in the United States, hastening the structural 
assimilation of Cubans but delaying the process of structural assimilation for Salvadorans. 
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This outcome may be explained by the shift in legal status for the Salvadoran cohort in 
1986, indicating that legal status in the United States may be the critical factor within the 
reception context for determining structural assimilation. Further intra-Salvadoran and 
intra-Cuban cohort comparisons of structural assimilation outcomes may lend further 
support to this observation. Alternatively, these somewhat differential long-term outcomes 
may also indicate that U.S. policy toward exile groups affects their rate of structural 
assimilation rather than their directionality. Further research specifically on these case’s 
rates of structural assimilation may provide a more nuanced understanding of the 
relationship between U.S. policy and structural assimilation.  
What is clear is that U.S. foreign policy toward a country can influence its 
immigration policy toward that country’s people. In the case of Cuba in the 1960s, U.S. 
foreign policy toward the adversarial Castro regime in Cuba generated a welcoming 
immigration policy for Cuban exiles. Conversely, in the case of El Salvador in the 1980s, 
the U.S. foreign policy of cooperation with the military junta in El Salvador necessitated a 
restrictive immigration policy toward Salvadoran exiles. In both cases, the interplay 
between internal push factors within the countries of origin and the pull factors in the 
United States resulted in the large-scale and long-duration migration of hundreds of 
thousands of Cubans and Salvadorans into the United States. Through geographic 
proximity and the self-reinforcing nature of migration flows, Cubans settled en masse in 
Miami, Florida beginning in the 1960s, and Salvadoran settled en masse in Los Angeles 
beginning in the 1980s.  
Each of these first-wave exile groups experienced a particular context of reception, 
shaped by the national and local government and economic, societal, and ethnic 
community-level conditions. As U.S. foreign policy influenced the exiles’ immigration 
status, it began a cascade of effects, from the decisive impact on the group’s initial ability 
to integrate economically to the identity ascribed to them at the national and local levels, 
down to the trajectory of their ethnic community. Within the reception context, Cubans 
experienced a consistently positive government response, whereas the reception for this 
cohort of Salvadoran exiles changed after a few years of their arrival, from negative to 
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passively accepting because of the amnesty clause in the 1986 Immigration Reform and 
Control Act.  
In the case of Miami-based Cubans, U.S. policy generated a consistently 
welcoming reception context that facilitated their economic and social integration—albeit 
with latent racial tensions—and Cubans’ creation of an ethnic community with a strong 
exile identity. Salvadorans in Los Angeles experienced a negative and later passively 
accepting reception: U.S. immigration policy and support for the Salvadoran military junta 
necessitated the exclusion of Salvadoran refugees, limited their economic opportunities, 
contributed to negative societal attitudes, and divided the ethnic community, but also 
sparked some activism in civil society. In both cases, the reception context created a 
particular opportunity structure for the immigrants’ socioeconomic integration: early 
Cuban exiles became an economic tour de force and powerful ethnic enclave in Miami; 
early Salvadoran exiles dominated labor-intensive low-wage jobs and established one of 
many ethnic communities in Los Angeles.  
Raised in this milieu, the second generations of these Cuban and Salvadoran 
immigrant cohorts have demonstrated somewhat different patterns of structural 
assimilation in the first 25 years following their parents’ arrivals. By the year 1990, the 
earliest adults of the Cuban second generation were largely well educated, well employed, 
and well compensated and showed indications of continued progress along these lines in 
2000 and 2005. For the early second-generation Salvadoran adults, metrics from the year 
2005 also reflect a well-educated cohort, but one still under-employed and under-
compensated in higher-status occupations.  
While these outcomes do not align with all parts of the hypothesis, they do lend 
support to Alba and Nee’s theory of new assimilation, demonstrating that, over time, the 
second generation assimilates, but to different degrees across groups. I contend that this 
difference is determined by immigrants’ legal status. For second-generation Cubans, the 
positive context of reception experienced by their parents aided their structural assimilation 
by facilitating their selective acculturation in Miami. Their parents’ eased resettlement in 
the United States—particularly their government-sponsored ability to transfer skills and 
experience into middle-class and higher occupations—and development of a powerful 
 96 
ethnic enclave all provided resources that benefitted the Cuban second generation. As a 
consequence, U.S.-born Cuban Americans adopted a dual American and Cuban identity, 
which allowed them to bridge the cultural gap between the society their parents originated 
from and the society they lived in. Moreover, the Miami enclave provided them educational 
and employment opportunities absent the discrimination many other immigrants find 
inescapable. This environment was made possible for them by the Cuban first generation, 
which was aided by welcoming immigration policies that supported broader American 
foreign policy goals. 
The negative, and later passively accepting, context of reception experienced by 
native Salvadoran-Americans’ parents limited the second generation’s structural 
assimilation by constraining the employment opportunities available to them in Los 
Angeles. Though the early years of their parents’ experience in the United States were 
complicated by their largely undocumented legal status, after 1986, legal residency became 
an option for this cohort, which contributed in part to their children’s relatively high 
educational attainment. Still, they faced negative typification in the labor force and low-
income surroundings, from which the second generation emerged to find a place in the 
middle class. Moreover, their parents were armed with human capital from El Salvador 
that was not readily translated into socioeconomic progress but that could have contributed 
to the second generation’s high educational attainment. As a community, Salvadorans in 
Los Angeles were slow to unite economically, directing their resources to their broader 
efforts to obtain legal or protected status and labor rights. Moreover, because the second 
generation outgrew the occupational opportunities within the Salvadoran ethnic enclave, 
their underemployment and under-compensation may also, at least in part, be a product of 
discriminatory practices by non-Salvadoran employers.  
This study’s focus on specific cohorts within the two cases allowed the results to 
illustrate the contours of two particular immigrant and ethnic groups in the United States. 
Because the results for Salvadoran assimilation differed from the more common 
characterization of the group as low achieving and its association with gangs, it reveals 
differential levels of assimilation within the population of Salvadoran exiles and 
immigrants. Moreover, throughout this research there were indications that these Cuban 
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assimilation patterns may also be different from those of later arrivals. Further research on 
immigrant groups with sustained migration flows should take these variances into account 
so as not to conflate later arrivals’ statistics with those of their cohort. While this study was 
limited in the capacity to collect and analyze pure census data, future studies may be able 
to better isolate particular cohorts’ data if these methods are available to them. 
Expanding these findings to later cohorts and taking changes in immigration policy 
as demarcation points, Cubans arriving after 2017 and Salvadorans arriving after 1982 are 
unlikely achieve upward structural assimilation without amnesty. Pre-1982 Salvadoran 
unauthorized arrivals were given a path to permanent residency in 1986, which I contend 
facilitated their upward structural assimilation in spite of other challenging factors in their 
reception context, but post-1982 unauthorized arrivals remain in liminal legal status, 
continuously dependent on temporary protected status to remain in the country. Similarly, 
in the case of Cubans, the 2017 end of preferential asylum ended the consistently available 
path to residency for the exiles and marked a similar dividing point within the Cuban 
community because new arrivals are now subject to deportation. Given the inherent 
challenges to unauthorized migrants’ educational and employment opportunities, without 
amnesty, these later arrivals are expected to underperform their predecessors in their ethnic 
communities.  
In addition, because the influence of foreign policy in immigration policy is most 
visible in forced migrations, case studies on this type of migration from regions beyond 
Latin America can provide additional insight into the effect of policy on assimilation 
patterns. Moreover, statistics on the various metrics of structural assimilation collected 
from now to the future may enable longitudinal analyses on particular cohorts and 
determine with more precision the rates of assimilation as they relate to the relevant policy 
decisions. Perhaps most importantly, additional studies can contest or confirm the 
relationship between U.S. policy and structural assimilation, as found in this thesis.  
 Lastly, contrary to the belief of nativists that immigrants become an underclass in 
American society, this study demonstrates that even an ethnic group—Salvadorans—
popularly associated with negative socioeconomic and criminal attributes makes 
socioeconomic advances across generations under the right legal conditions. Such 
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outcomes indicate that U.S. immigration policy has a causal effect on assimilation. While 
it is possible Salvadoran achievement would be higher if their reception had been more 
uniformly favorable, the evidence of educational advancement and economic advancement 
beyond the low-wage labor of the cohort’s first generation indicates that the impact of legal 
status may be the strongest predictor of structural assimilation outcomes. This relation is 
also consistent with the positive outcomes in Cuban structural assimilation.  Thus, to the 
extent that legal status is a predictor of structural assimilation, policymakers can encourage 
upward assimilation by shifting away from temporary legal status and toward permanent 
residency through amnesty for unauthorized immigrant communities while enforcing 
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